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Abstract—Blockchains are distributed systems, in which secu-
rity is a critical factor for their success. However, despite their
increasing popularity and adoption, there is a lack of standard-
ized models that study blockchain-related security threats. To
fill this gap, the main focus of our work is to systematize and
extend the knowledge about the security and privacy aspects of
blockchains and contribute to the standardization of this domain.
We propose the security reference architecture (SRA) for
blockchains, which adopts a stacked model (similar to the
ISO/OSI) describing the nature and hierarchy of various security
and privacy aspects. The SRA contains four layers: (1) the
network layer, (2) the consensus layer, (3) the replicated state
machine layer, and (4) the application layer. At each of these
layers, we identify known security threats, their origin, and
countermeasures, while we also analyze several cross-layer depen-
dencies. Next, to enable better reasoning about security aspects of
blockchains by the practitioners, we propose a blockchain-specific
version of the threat-risk assessment standard ISO/IEC 15408
by embedding the stacked model into this standard. Finally, we
provide designers of blockchain platforms and applications with a
design methodology following the model of SRA and its hierarchy.
Index Terms—Reference architecture, blockchains, distributed
ledgers, security, privacy, vulnerabilities, threats, ISO/IEC 15408.
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of blockchain systems has rapidly increased
in recent years, mainly due to the decentralization of control
that they aim to provide. Blockchains are full-stack distributed
systems in which multiple layers, (sub)systems, and dynamics
interact together. Hence, they should leverage a secure and
resilient networking architecture, a robust consensus protocol,
and a safe environment for building higher-level applica-
tions. Although most of the deployed blockchains need better
scalability and well-aligned incentives to unleash their full
potential, their security is undoubtedly a critical factor for
their success. As these systems are actively being developed
and deployed, it is often challenging to understand how secure
they are, or what security implications are introduced by some
specific components they consist of. Moreover, due to their
complexity and novelty (e.g., built-in protocol incentives),
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their security assessment and analysis requires a more holistic
view than in the case of traditional distributed systems.
Although some standardization efforts have already been
undertaken, they are either specific to a particular platform [1]
or still under development [2], [3]. Hence, there is a lack
of platform-agnostic standards in blockchain implementation,
interoperability, services, and applications, as well as the
analysis of its security threats [4], [5]. All of these areas are
challenging, and it might take years until they are standardized
and agreed across a diverse spectrum of stakeholders. In
this work, we aim to contribute to the standardization of
security threat analysis. We believe that it is critical to provide
blockchain stakeholders (developers, users, standardization
bodies, regulators, etc.) with a comprehensive systematization
of knowledge about the security and privacy aspects of today’s
blockchain systems.
In this work, we aim to achieve this goal, with a particular
focus on system design and architectural aspects. We do not
limit our work to an enumeration of security issues, but
additionally, discuss the origins of those issues while listing
possible countermeasures and mitigation techniques together
with their potential implications. As our main contribution,
we propose the security reference architecture for blockchains,
which is based on models that demonstrate the stacked hierar-
chy of different threat categories (similar to the ISO/OSI hier-
archy [6]) and inspired by security modeling performed in the
cloud computing [7], [8]. As our next contribution, we enrich
the threat-risk assessment standard ISO/IEC 15408 [9] to fit
the blockchain infrastructure. We achieve this by embedding
the stacked model into this standard.
This paper is based on our recent work outlining the
security reference architecture [10]. We substantially modify
and extend it by the following:
• We provide a theoretical background related to the
security reference architecture and the environment of
blockchains, their types, failure models, consensus pro-
tocols, design goals, and means to achieve these goals.
• For each layer, we model particular attacks or their cate-
gories through vulnerability/threat/defense graphs, while
we provide reasoning about several important relations
and causalities in these graphs.
• We modify and significantly extend the application layer,
where we propose a novel functionality-oriented catego-
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2rization, as opposed to the application-domain-oriented
categorizations presented in related work [11], [12].
• We extend and revise the consensus layer by mining-pool-
specific attacks, time-spoofing attacks, and we provide a
more fine-grained categorization.
• For each layer, we present an incident table that lists and
briefly describes examples of attacks that have occurred
worldwide: either caused by malicious parties or by
researchers who demonstrated their practical feasibility.
• In the lessons learned, we describe the hierarchy of
security dependencies among particular categories, based
on which, we propose a methodology for designers of
blockchain platforms and applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We de-
scribe the scope and methodology of our research as well as
quantitative analysis of the included literature in Section II.
In Section III we summarize the background on blockchain
systems. Next, in Section IV we introduce the security ref-
erence architecture whose layers are discussed in the follow-
up sections. In detail, Section V deals with the security and
privacy of the network layer, Section VI focuses on the
consensus layer, Section VII overviews the replicated state
machine layer, and Section VIII with Section IX describe
applications built on top of the blockchain. In Section X,
we elaborate on lessons learned and propose a methodology
for designers of blockchain-based solutions. We discuss the
limitations of our work in Section XI and we compare our
research to related work in Section XII. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Section XIII.
II. METHODOLOGY & SCOPE
In contrast to conventional survey approaches, such as
grounded theory for rigorous literature review [13], we do
not sample included research from existing databases queried
with specific terms. Instead, we study and analyze security-
oriented literature for vulnerabilities and threats related to
the blockchain infrastructure. The literature that we select as
the input mainly covers existing blockchain-oriented surveys
as well as various conferences and journals in security and
distributed computing. Moreover, we include other materials
published in preprints, whitepapers, products’ documentations,
and forums, which are also related.
We aim to consolidate the literature, categorize found vul-
nerabilities and threats according to their origin, and in the
result, we create four main categories (also referred to as
layers). At the level of particular main categories, we apply
sub-categorization that is based on the existing knowledge and
operation principles specific to such subcategories, especially
concerning the security implications. If some subcategories
impose equivalent security implications, we merge them into
a single subcategory. See the road-map of all the categories
in Figure 4. Our next aim is to indicate and explain the co-
occurrences or relations of multiple threats, either at the same
main category or across more categories.
The scope of our work mainly covers aspects related to the
blockchain core elements, while we mention common opera-
tional security issues (e.g., key management in the blockchain
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Figure 1: Blockchain-specific references per category.
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Figure 2: Blockchain-specific academic references over time.
ecosystem) and countermeasures only tangentially if required.
Similarly, we do not pursue threats that emerge outside of the
blockchain infrastructure and outside of the extra infrastructure
required for certain blockchain-based applications. Out-of-
scope examples are remote exploitation of arbitrary devices
(e.g., covert mining/cryptojacking [14]) and issues related to
using blockchain explorers (e.g., spoofing attacks, availability
issues). Examples of vulnerabilities that we assume only
tangentially are semantic bugs and programming errors in
the infrastructure of the blockchains – we assume that core
blockchain infrastructure is implemented correctly, uses secure
cryptographic primitives, and provides expected functionality.
A. Quantitative Analysis
For a quantitative summary of the literature, we considered
only the references from the main sections that correspond to
particular layers of the proposed stacked model (i.e., Section V
to Section IX) and related work (Section XII). We excluded
references from other sections and the references on the
examples of incidents (Appendix C). Each assumed reference
was labeled with three flags to indicate:
• The category to which it belongs. Note that some papers
belong to multiple categories.
• Whether it is specifically related to blockchains.
• Whether it was written by academics (i.e., such that their
affiliation was listed in the document). Note that the
positive value of this flag covers also the papers that have
not been peer-reviewed but which appeared on public
repositories (e.g., arXiv and Cryptology ePrint Archive).
3In sum, we collected 274 references, of which 242 were
blockchain-specific, 209 were written by academics, and 178
met both criteria. In Figure 1, we show the number of
references in each of the main categories for (a) all papers
and (b) the academic papers. A total of 11 papers were found
to belong to two categories. We observe that most of the
references are presented at the application layer, which we
conjecture that occurred due to the fact that each application
running on the blockchain might introduce new attack vectors.
The evolution of the number of references over time is
depicted in Figure 2, where we observe that the number of
academic papers about blockchains and security has increased
steadily, although 2018 was the year with the highest number
of references selected for the current work. Of the four layers
discussed in this paper, the network layer has the lowest
number of blockchain-focused papers. A possible reason for
it could be that among the remaining layers, the consensus
and RSM layers are more specific to blockchains, while the
application layer is popular among practitioners building on
top of other layers. Finally, we observe the number of surveys
is steadily growing (culminating in 2019), which indicates
increasing interest in this domain.
III. BLOCKCHAINS AT A GLANCE
The blockchain is a data structure representing an append-
only distributed ledger that consists of entries (a.k.a., trans-
actions) aggregated within ordered blocks. The order of the
blocks is agreed upon by mutually untrusting participants run-
ning a consensus protocol – these participants are also referred
to as nodes. The blockchain is resistant against modifications
by design, since blocks are linked using a cryptographic hash
function, and each new block has to be agreed upon by nodes
running a consensus protocol.
A transaction is an elementary data entry that may contain
arbitrary data, e.g., an order to transfer native cryptocurrency
(i.e., crypto-tokens), a piece of application code (i.e., smart
contract), the execution orders of such application code, etc.
Transactions sent to a blockchain are validated by all nodes
that maintain a replicated state of the blockchain.
Blockchains were initially introduced as a means of coping
with the centralization of monetary assets management, result-
ing in their most popular application – a decentralized cryp-
tocurrency. Nevertheless, other blockchain applications have
emerged, benefiting from features other than decentralization,
e.g., privacy, energy efficiency, throughput, etc. For the review
of the inherent and non-inherent features of the blockchains,
we refer the reader to Appendix A.
A. Involved Parties
Blockchains usually involve three native types of parties that
can be organized into a hierarchy, according to the actions that
they perform (see Figure 3):
(1) Consensus nodes (a.k.a., miners in Proof-of-Resource
protocols) actively participate in the underlying consensus
protocol. These nodes can read the blockchain and write
to it by appending new transactions. Additionally, they
can validate the blockchain and thus check whether writes
…
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Figure 3: Involved parties with their interactions and hierarchy.
of other consensus nodes are correct. Consensus nodes
can prevent malicious behaviors (e.g., by not appending
invalid transactions, or ignoring an incorrect chain).
(2) Validating nodes read the entire blockchain, validate it,
and disseminate transactions. Unlike consensus nodes,
validating nodes cannot write to the blockchain, and
thus they cannot prevent malicious behaviors. On the
other hand, they can detect malicious behavior since they
possess copies of the entire blockchain.
(3) Lightweight nodes (a.k.a., clients or SPV1 clients) bene-
fit from most of the blockchain functionalities, but they
are equipped only with limited information about the
blockchain. These nodes can read only fragments of the
blockchain (usually block headers) and validate only a
small number of transactions that concern them, while
they rely on consensus and validating nodes. Therefore,
they can detect only a limited set of attacks, pertaining
to their own transactions.
Additional Involved Parties. Note that besides native types
of involved parties, many applications using or running on the
blockchain introduce their own (centralized) components.
B. Types of Blockchains
Based on how a new node enters a consensus protocol, we
distinguish the following blockchain types:
Permissionless blockchains allow anyone to join the consen-
sus protocol without permission. To prevent Sybil at-
tacks, this type of blockchains usually requires consensus
nodes to establish their identities by running a Proof-of-
Resource protocol, where the consensus power of a node
is proportional to its resources allocated.
Permissioned blockchains require a consensus node to obtain
permission to join the consensus protocol from a central-
ized or federated authority(ies), while nodes usually have
equal consensus power (i.e., one vote per node).
Semi-Permissionless blockchains require a consensus node to
obtain some form of permission (i.e., stake) before joining
the protocol; however, such permission can be given by
any consensus node. The consensus power of a node is
proportional to the stake that it has.
1Simplified Payment Verification.
4C. Design Goals of Consensus Protocols
1) Standard Design Goals – Liveness and Safety:
Liveness ensures that all valid transactions are eventually
processed – i.e., if a transaction is received by a single honest
node, it will eventually be delivered to all honest nodes. Safety
ensures that if an honest node accepts (or rejects) a transaction,
then all other honest nodes make the same decision. Usually,
consensus protocols satisfy safety and liveness only under
certain assumptions: the minimal fraction of honest consensus
power or the maximal fraction of adversarial consensus power.
With regard to the safety, literature often uses the term finality
and time to finality. Finality represents the sequence of the
blocks from the genesis block up to the block B, where it
can be assumed that this sequence of blocks is infeasible to
overturn. To reach finality up to the block B, several successive
blocks need to be appended after B – the number of such
blocks is referred to as the number of confirmations.
2) Specific Design Goals:
As a result of this study, we learned that standard design
goals of the consensus protocol should be amended by specific
design goals related to the type of the blockchain. In permis-
sionless type, elimination of Sybil entities, a fresh and fair
leader/committee election, and non-interactive verification of
the consensus result is required to meet. In contrast, the (semi)-
permissionless types do not require the elimination of Sybil
entities (see details in Section X-C).
3) Means to Achieve Design Goals:
Simulation of the Verifiable Random Function (VRF). To
ensure a fresh and fair leader/committee election, all consensus
nodes should contribute to the pseudo-randomness generation
that determines the fresh result of the election. This can be
captured by the concept of the VRF [15], which ensures the
unpredictability and fairness of the election process. Therefore,
the leader/committee election process can be viewed as a
simulation of VRF [16]. Thanks to the properties of VRF,
the correctness of the election result can be verified non-
interactively after the election took place.
Incentive and Rewarding Schemes. An important aspect for
protocol designers is to include a rewarding/incentive scheme
that motivates consensus nodes to participate honestly in the
protocol. In the context of public (permissionless) blockchains
that introduce their native crypto-tokens, this is achieved by
block creation rewards as well as transaction fees, and op-
tionally penalties for misbehavior. Transaction fees and block
creation rewards are attributed to the consensus node(s) that
create a valid block (e.g., [17]), although alternative incentive
schemes rewarding more consensus nodes at the same time are
also possible (e.g., [18]). While transaction fees are included
in a particular transaction, the block reward is usually part of
the first transaction in the block (a.k.a., coinbase transaction).
D. Basis of Consensus Protocols
Lottery and voting are two marginal techniques that deal
with the establishment of a consensus [19]. However, in
addition to them, their combinations have become popular.
Lottery-Based Protocols. These protocols provide consensus
by running a lottery that elects a leader/committee, who pro-
duces the block. The advantages of lottery-based approaches
are a small network traffic overheads and high scalability since
the process is usually non-interactive (e.g., [17], [20], [21]).
However, a disadvantage of this approach is the possibility
of multiple “winners” being elected, who propose conflicting
blocks, which naturally leads to inconsistencies called forks.
Forks are resolved by fork-choice rules, which compute the
difficulty of each branch and select the one. For the longest
chain rule, the chain with the largest number of blocks is
selected in the case of a conflict, while for the strongest chain
rule, the selection criteria involve a quality of each block in
the chain (e.g., [22], [23], [24], [25], [18]). Note that the
possibility of forks in this category of protocols causes an
increase of the time to finality, which in turn might enable
some attacks such as double-spending.
Voting-Based Protocols. In this group of protocols, the
agreement on transactions is reached through the votes of all
participants. Examples include Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT)
protocols – which require the consensus of a majority quorum
(usually 2/3) of all consensus nodes. (e.g., [26], [27], [28],
[29], [30]). The advantage of this category is a low-latency
finality due to a negligible likelihood of forks. The protocols
from this group suffer from low scalability, and thus their
throughput forms a trade-off with scalability (i.e., the higher
the number of nodes, the lower the throughput).
Combinations. To improve the scalability of voting-based
protocols, it is desirable to shrink the number of consensus
nodes participating in the voting by a lottery, so that only
nodes of such a committee vote for a block (e.g., [31], [32],
[33], [34], [29]). Another option to reduce active voting nodes
is to split them into several groups (a.k.a., shards) that run a
consensus protocol in parallel (e.g., [35], [36]). Such a setting
further increases the throughput in contrast to the single-group
option, but on the other hand, it requires a mechanism that
accomplishes inter-shard transactions.
E. Failure Models in Distributed Consensus Protocols
The relevant literature mentions two main failure models
for consensus protocols [37]:
Fail-Stop Failures: A node either stops its operation or con-
tinues to operate, while obviously exposing its faulty
behavior to other nodes. Hence, all other nodes are
aware of the faulty state of that node (e.g., tolerated in
Paxos [38], Raft [39], Viewstamped Replication [40]).
Byzantine Failures: In this model, the failed nodes (a.k.a.,
Byzantine nodes) may perform arbitrary actions, includ-
ing malicious behavior targeting the consensus proto-
col and collusions with other Byzantine nodes. Hence,
the Byzantine failure model is of particular interest to
security-critical applications, such as blockchains (e.g.,
Nakamoto’s consensus [17], pure BFT protocols [26],
[27], [28], [41], and hybrid protocols [31], [35], [36]).
5IV. THE SECURITY REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE
We present two models of the security reference architec-
ture, which facilitate systematic studying of vulnerabilities and
threats related to the blockchains and applications running on
top of them. First, we introduce the stacked model, which we
then project into the threat-risk assessment model.
A. Stacked Model
To classify the security aspects of blockchains, we utilize a
stacked model consisting of four layers (see Figure 4). A sim-
ilar stacked model was already proposed in the literature [16],
but in contrast to it, we preserve only such a granularity level
that enables us to isolate security threats and their nature,
which is the key focus of our work. In the following, we
briefly describe each layer.
(1) The network layer consists of the data representation
and network services planes. The data representation
plane deals with the storage, encoding, and protection of
data, while the network service plane contains the discov-
ery and communication with protocol peers, addressing,
routing, and naming services.
(2) The consensus layer deals with the ordering of trans-
actions, and we divide it into three main categories
according to the protocol type: Byzantine Fault Tolerant,
Proof-of-Resource, and Proof-of-Stake protocols.
(3) The replicated state machine (RSM) layer deals with
the interpretation of transactions, according to which
the state of the blockchain is updated. In this layer,
transactions are categorized into two parts, where the
first part deals with the privacy of data in transactions
as well as the privacy of the users who created them, and
the second part – smart contracts – deals with security
and safety aspects of decentralized code execution in this
environment.
(4) The application layer contains the most common end-
user functionalities and services. We divide this layer into
two groups. The first group represents the applications
that provide common functionalities for most of the
higher-level blockchain applications, and it contains the
following categories: wallets, exchanges, oracles, filesys-
tems, identity management, and secure timestamping. We
refer to this group as applications of the blockchain
ecosystem. The next group of application types resides at
a higher level and focuses on providing certain end-user
functionality. This group contains categories such as e-
voting, notaries, identity management, auctions, escrows,
etc. We found out that these higher-level applications
inherit security aspects from particular categories in the
underlying ecosystem group (see Figure 15).
Throughout the paper, we summarize components and cate-
gories of particular layers of the reference architecture with
their respective security threats, their origin, and corresponding
countermeasures and/or mitigation techniques.
B. Threat-Risk Assessment Model
To better capture the security-related aspects of blockchain
systems, we introduce a threat-risk model (see Figure 5) that
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Figure 4: Stacked model of the security reference architecture.
is based on the template of ISO/IEC 15408 [9] and projection
of our stacked model (see Section IV-A). This model includes
the following components and actors:
Owners are blockchain users who run any type of node and
they exist at the application layer and the consensus
layer. Owners possess crypto-tokens, and they might use
or provide blockchain-based applications and services.
Additionally, owners involve consensus nodes that earn
crypto-tokens from running the consensus protocol.
Assets are present at the application layer, and they consist
of monetary value (i.e., crypto-tokens or other tokens) as
well as the availability of application-layer services and
functionalities built on top of blockchains (e.g., notaries,
escrows, data provenance, auctions). The authenticity of
users, the privacy of users, and the privacy of data
might also be considered as application-specific assets.
Furthermore, we include here the reputation of service
providers using the blockchain services.
Threat agents are spread across all the layers of the stacked
model, and they mostly involve malicious users whose
intention is to steal assets, break functionalities, or disrupt
services. However, threat agents might also be inadver-
tent entities, such as developers of smart contracts who
unintentionally create bugs and designers of blockchain
applications who make mistakes in the design or ignore
some issues.
Threats facilitate various attacks on assets, and they might
exist at all layers of the stacked model. Threats arise from
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Figure 5: Threat-risk assessment model of the security reference
architecture.
vulnerabilities at the network, in smart contracts, from
consensus protocol deviations, violations of consensus
protocol assumptions, and application-specific vulnerabil-
ities.
Countermeasures protect owners from threats by the risk
minimization of compromising/losing the assets. Alike
the threats and threat agents, countermeasures can be
applied at each of the layers of our stacked model,
and they involve various security/privacy/safety solutions,
incentive schemes, reputation techniques, best practices,
etc. Nevertheless, we emphasize that their utilization usu-
ally imposes some limitations such as higher complexity
and additional performance overheads (e.g., resulting in
decreased throughput).
Risks are related to the application layer, and they are caused
by threats and their agents. Risks may lead to a loss of
monetary assets, a loss of privacy, a loss of reputation,
service malfunctions, and disruptions of services and
applications (i.e., availability issues).
The owners wish to minimize the risk caused by threats that
arise from threat agents. Within our stacked model, different
threat agents appear at each layer. At the network layer,
there are service providers including parties managing IP
addresses and DNS names. The threats at this layer arise
from man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, network partitioning,
de-anonymization, and availability attacks. Countermeasures
contain protection of availability, naming, routing, anonymity,
and data. At the consensus layer, consensus nodes may be
malicious and wish to alter the outcome of the consensus
protocol by deviating from it. Moreover, if they are powerful
enough, malicious nodes might violate assumptions of con-
sensus protocols to take over the execution of the protocol
or cause its disruption. The countermeasures include well-
designed economic incentives, strong consistency, decentral-
ization, and fast finality solutions. At the RSM layer, the
threat agents may stand for developers who (un)intentionally
introduce semantic bugs in smart contracts (intentional bugs
represent backdoors) as well as users and external adver-
saries running lightweight nodes who pose threats due to
the exploitation of such bugs. Countermeasures include safe
languages, static/dynamic analysis, formal verification, au-
dits, best practices, and design patterns. Other threats of
the RSM layer are related to compromising the privacy of
data and user identities with mitigation techniques involving
mixers, privacy-preserving cryptography constructs (e.g., non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs), ring signatures,
blinding signatures, homomorphic encryption) as well as usage
of trusted hardware (respecting its assumptions and attacker
models declared). At the application layer, threat agents
are broad and involve arbitrary internal or external adver-
saries such as users, service providers, malware, designers of
applications and services, manufactures of trusted execution
environments (TEE) for concerned applications (e.g., oracles,
auctions), authorities in the case of applications that require
them for arbitration (e.g., escrows, auctions) or filtering of
users (e.g., e-voting, auctions), token issuers. The threats on
this layer might arise from false data feeds, censorship by
application-specific authorities (e.g., auctions, e-voting), front
running attacks, disruption of the availability of centralized
components, compromising application-level privacy, misbe-
having of the token issuer, misbehaving of manufacturer of
TEE or permanent hardware (HW) faults in TEE. Examples
of mitigation techniques are multi-factor authentication, HW
wallets with displays for signing transactions, redundancy/dis-
tributions of some centralized components, reputation systems,
and privacy preserving-constructs as part of the applications
themselves. We elaborate closer on vulnerabilities, threats, and
countermeasures (or mitigation techniques) related to each
layer of the stacked model in the following sections.
Involved Parties & Blockchain’s Life-Cycle. In Sec-
tion III, we presented several types of involved parties in
the blockchain infrastructure (see Figure 3). We emphasize
that these parties are involved in the operational stage of the
blockchain’s life-cycle. However, in the design and develop-
ment stages of the blockchain’s life-cycle, programmers and
designers should also be considered as potential threat agents
who influence the security aspects of the whole blockchain in-
frastructure (regardless of whether their intention is malicious
or not). This is of great concern especially for applications
built on top of blockchains (i.e., at the application layer) since
these applications are usually not reviewed by the community
or public, as it is typical for other (lower) layers.
7V. NETWORK LAYER
Blockchains usually introduce peer-to-peer overlay net-
works built on top of other networks (see Figure 6). Hence,
blockchains inherit security and privacy issues from their un-
derlying networks. In our model (see Figure 4), we divide the
network layer into data representation and network services
sub-planes. The data representation plane is protected by cryp-
tographic primitives that ensure data integrity, user authentica-
tion, and optionally confidentiality, privacy, anonymity, non-
repudiation, and accountability. The main services provided
by the network layer are peer management and discovery,
which rely on the internals of the underlying network, such
as domain name resolution (i.e., DNS) or network routing
protocols. Based on permission to join the blockchain system,
the networks are either private or public. In the following, we
discuss the pros and cons of private and public networks as
well as their security threats and mitigation techniques.
A. Private Networks
A private network ensures low latency, a centralized ad-
ministration, privacy, and meeting regulatory obligations (e.g.,
HIPAA2 for healthcare data). The organization owning the
network provides access to local participants as well as to
external ones when required; hence, systems deploying pri-
vate networks belong to the group of permissioned private
blockchains. Private networks inherently provide authentica-
tion and access control.
1) Pros: Access control is achieved by centralized
authentication of users. A private network has full control
over routing paths and physical resources used, which enables
suitable regulation of the network topology with regard to the
given requirements. Data privacy is ensured by permissioned
settings. User identities might only be revealed within a
private group of nodes. Fine-grained authorization controls are
applied by the operators of the network resources to implement
the security principle of minimal exposure and thus mitigate
insider threat attacks on a local network. Resource availability
is easier to manage and foresee, as all network participants and
the deployment scenario are known ahead of time.
2) Cons: Virtual Private Network (VPN) connectivity
is required to communicate between private networks spread
over different geographical locations. While VPNs are in
general secure, they inherit the disadvantages of running a
service over the Internet. Private networks are suitable only
for permissioned blockchains.
3) Security Threats and Countermeasures: We present
a taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses against
them in Figure 7. We identified insiders and external targeted
attacks as the specific security threats for the (permissioned)
blockchains running over the private networks. These threats
are possible due to a centralization of access control that might
occur in private networks, and thus permissioned blockchains.
An external attacker might exploit a network or system vulner-
ability and obtain access to an element responsible for access
control to the blockchain. In the case of the insider threat, she
2Health insurance portability and accountability act, https://hipaa.com/.
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Figure 6: Overlaying of blockchains over a private/public network.
may already have the necessary privileges or obtain them by
exploiting the system, network, or organization vulnerabilities.
In the result, the attacker is able to add malicious consensus
nodes into the network or remove legitimate ones, and thereby
increase the adversarial consensus power that is manifested
at the consensus layer; in turn, this may lead to plenty of
attacks occurring at the consensus layer (see Section VI) such
as attacks on violation of protocol assumptions.
Countermeasures include regular software updates, monitor-
ing of users, network, and systems (e.g., by SIEM, anti-virus
software, intrusion detection systems), prevention techniques
that minimize trust and maximize trustworthiness such as two-
factor authentication for access control decisions (effective for
the external attacker), as well as respecting best practices for
mitigation of insider threat [42]. Another option of coping with
the centralization of access control is to embed decentralized
access control into the consensus layer and thus mandating a
requirement on reaching a consensus of a quorum of nodes for
each access control decision. In contrast to the other mentioned
countermeasures, the embedding of access control into the
consensus layer is more effective since it eliminates a single-
point-of-failure of centralized access control service, and thus
it makes an increase of adversarial consensus power more
difficult for the attacker – the attacker has to compromise a
high number of independent consensus nodes.
4) Side Effects of Countermeasures: Most of the
mentioned countermeasures do not cause negative effects on
the features of the blockchains under normal circumstances.
The exception might be embedding of access control into the
consensus layer under the assumption that the set of consensus
nodes in the network is extremely dynamic, and thus nodes
are entering and leaving the blockchain very often. In such a
case, the throughput of the blockchain might be decreased.
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(network layer).
B. Public Networks / the Internet
Public networks provide high decentralization, openness,
and low entry barrier, while network latency, privacy, and
network control are put aside. These networks are naturally
required by all public (permissionless) blockchain systems.
1) Pros: High availability is attractive to multi-homed
nodes since they have alternate routes to send and receive
messages. Multi-homed nodes may benefit from disseminating
blocks across multiple channels, thereby increasing the chance
of blocks being appended to the blockchain. High decentral-
ization is achieved through geographical dispersion of nodes.
Public peer-to-peer (p2p) networks are harder to shut down.
Openness and low entry barriers on the Internet are achieved
through wide adoption, technology interoperability (e.g., using
TCP/IP), economic (e.g., low cost of broadband connection),
and societal (e.g., resistance to regulations) factors.
2) Cons: Single-point-of-failure – DNS with its
hierarchy, IP addresses, and autonomous systems (ASes) are
managed by centralized parties – Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN); in particular, In-
ternet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). External adver-
saries pose a threat to public networks. These adversaries
can be classified based on their capabilities to which the
blockchain network may be exposed [43]: (1) resources un-
der attacker control (e.g., botnets, DNS and BGP servers),
(2) identities are stolen or masqueraded (e.g., IP addresses
participating in an eclipse attack or route manipulation), (3)
MITM attacker (i.e., eavesdropping and spoofing), (4) the
exploitation of common network vulnerabilities, (5) revealing
secrets (e.g., de-anonymizing peers). Efficiency – although an
average Internet bandwidth has been improved in recent years,
distribution of powerful infrastructure is not uniform, which
results in a different latency among peers, and thus the overall
latency of the network is increased; this might result in the
loss of created blocks and thus wasting consensus power.
3) Security Threats and Countermeasures: We present
a taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
public networks in Figure 8, while in Table III of Appendix,
we list several incidents that occurred in practice. In the
following, we describe these threats as well as possible defense
techniques.
DNS attacks arise from cache poisoning that mainly affects
blockchains employing centralized DNS bootstrapping to
retrieve online peers from a hard-coded list of DNS seed-
ers. One countermeasure is a security extension of DNS,
called DNSSEC, which provides authentication and data
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Figure 8: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses in public networks
(network layer).
integrity. In addition to standard DNS, name resolution
can also be made using alternate DNS servers [44].
Routing attacks are traffic route diversions, hijacking, or
DoS attacks. Besides simple data eavesdropping or mod-
ification, these attacks may lead to network partitioning,
which in turn raises the risks of 51% attacks or selfish
mining attacks presented at the consensus layer (see
Section VI). Apostolaki et al. [45] demonstrated that
the Bitcoin protocol is vulnerable to BGP routing at-
tacks where the attacker controlling a transit autonomous
system (AS) can modify inter-domain routes for a few
Bitcoin nodes and cause network partitioning. However,
perpetration of this attack reveals the identity of the
malicious AS, which might have immediate reputation
consequences.
Countermeasures are multi-homed nodes (or using VPN)
for route diversity, choosing extra peers whose connec-
tions do not pass through the same ASes, preference
of peers hosted on the same AS within the same /24
prefix (to reduce risk of partitions), and fetching the same
9block from multiple peers [45]. Another mitigation is
SABRE [46], a secure relay network that runs alongside
with the Bitcoin network. Further, BGPsec is a security
extension for BGP used between neighboring ASes, and
it provides assurance of route origin and propagation by
cryptographic verification.
Eclipse attacks aim to hijack all connections of a node to its
peers in a blockchain network. Consequently, all traffic
received and sent by the node is under the full control
of the attacker. Eclipse attacks arise from threats on
DNS and routing in the network, and they may be a
result of vulnerabilities in p2p protocols [47], [48], [49].
Eclipse attacks increase chances of selfish mining and
double-spending attacks (see Section VI) – the eclipsed
victims may unknowingly vote for an attacker’s chain,
and thus cause a network partitioning. Erebus [50] is
a stealthier attack causing network partitioning as com-
pared to Apostolaki et al. [45]. However, Erebus is not
a routing attack since it does not involve BGP prefix
hijacking (which is easy to detect) and has a very small
network traffic footprint. In Erebus, the attacker controls a
large number of shadow IP addresses and influences the
victim’s peer selection mechanism to pick all outgoing
connections with shadow IP addresses. This is achieved
through slowly flooding the victim’s peer tables by in-
coming connections from the attacker-controlled shadow
IP addresses.
Countermeasures: Improving randomness in choosing
peers was proposed in the work of Heilman et al. [47]
by several rules that manage the peer table. Another
mitigation strategy against eclipse attacks is to use redun-
dant network links or out-of-band connections to verify
transactions (e.g., by a blockchain explorer). Eclipse
attacks can also be detected by employing out-of-band
gossip networks (e.g., web-servers) [51] that communi-
cate with lightweight clients to exchange their views on
the blockchain (i.e., block headers) along with native
web traffic. Erebus attacks can be made much harder
by decreasing the size of the peer tables, increasing the
number of peers, preferring the peers that provide fresh
data, and incorporation the topology of ASes into the
peer selection process. Also, note that countermeasures
for DNS and routing attacks are applicable here as well.
DoS attacks on connectivity of consensus nodes may result
in a loss of consensus power, thus preventing consensus
nodes from being rewarded [52]. For validating nodes,
this attack leads to a disruption of some blockchain-
dependent services [53]. Countermeasures: One mitiga-
tion is to peer only with white-listed nodes. Methods
to prevent volumetric DDoS include on-premise filtering
(i.e., with an extra network device), cloud filtering (i.e.,
redirection of traffic through a cloud when DDoS is
detected or through a cloud DDoS mitigation service),
or hybrid filtering [54].
DoS attacks on resources such as memory and storage, may
reduce the peering and consensus capabilities [55] of
nodes. An example attack is flooding the network with
low fee transactions (a.k.a., penny-flooding), which may
cause memory pool depletion, resulting in a system crash.
A possible mitigation is raising the minimum transaction
fee and the rate-limit to the number of transactions. Sev-
eral mitigating techniques were applied to Bitcoin [56]
nodes including scoring DoS attacks and banning misbe-
having peers. DoS attacks may also target (additional)
centralized elements of blockchain infrastructure, such
as servers communicating with hosted wallets (see Sec-
tion VIII-A), which in turn might lead to application layer
attacks targeting clients of the wallets.
Identity revealing attacks are conducted by linking the IP
address of a node with an identity propagated in transac-
tions [57], [58]. Traffic analysis using Sybil listeners can
reveal the linkage of node IP addresses and their trans-
actions [59]. Countermeasures include using VPNs or
anonymization services, such as Tor. See Section VII-A1
for further identity and privacy-protecting mechanisms at
the RSM layer.
4) Side Effects of Countermeasures: The anonymization
services (such as Tor) cause deterioration of connectivity for
consensus nodes, and these nodes might not distribute the
created block on time and thus lose their reward. On the
other hand, the slow connectivity of anonymization services
can be acceptable for validating nodes and clients for messages
related to the creation and validation of their own transactions.
The trade-off for connectivity and anonymity can be provided
by VPN services, which are fast but they are usually operated
by a centralized party, and thus the risk of de-anonymization is
higher than in the case of anonymization services. Increasing
the number of outgoing peer connections as protection against
eclipse attacks [50] can increase the volume of data that needs
to be transferred, which negatively impacts the throughput
of blockchains. Furthermore, fetching the same blocks from
multiple peers [45] may contribute to the network congestion
under certain configurations of blockchains focusing on a high
throughput – this might lead slow down in keeping touch with
the tip of the blockchain and thereby impact a response time
of an application running on top of it. The response time of
the application might be also impacted by cloud and hybrid
filtering that relay some incoming traffic through 3rd party
services.
VI. CONSENSUS LAYER
The consensus layer of the stacked model deals with the
ordering of transactions, while the interpretation of them is
left for the RSM layer (see Section VII). The consensus
layer includes three main categories of consensus protocols
concerning different principles of operation and thus their
security aspects. First, we focus on the security aspects that
are generic to all categories, and then we detail each category.
A. Generic Attacks
We present a taxonomy of the generic threats to all types of
consensus protocols, their origins, and defenses against them
in Figure 9. These threats originate mainly from violation of
protocol assumptions but also due to a long time to the finality
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of some consensus protocols. In the following, we describe
these threats as well as possible defense techniques.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations:
Adversarial Centralization of Consensus Power. In these
attacks, a design assumption about the decentralized
distribution of consensus power is violated. Examples of
this category are 51% attacks for PoR and PoS protocols
as well as 13 of Byzantine nodes for BFT protocols (and
their combinations). In a 51% attack, the majority of the
consensus power is held by the adversary, thus also the
result of the protocol is under its control. In Byzantine
attacks, a quorum of 13 adversarial consensus nodes might
cause the protocol to be disrupted or even halted. As a
design-oriented countermeasure, it is important to pro-
mote decentralization by incentive schemes that reward
honest participation and discourage [60] or punish [61],
[32] protocol violations. Another mitigation that makes
these attacks more expensive is a statistical analysis of
sudden anomalies in the history of the consensus power
distribution among nodes, which can be embedded in the
fork choice rule of the consensus protocol [62].
Breaking Network Assumptions. Protocols assuming syn-
chronous or partially synchronous network delivery
would inevitably fail when this assumption does not
hold. For instance, this assumption can be violated in
BFT protocols by an unpredictable network scheduler,
as demonstrated on PBFT protocol [63]. This fact moti-
vates asynchronous BFT protocols that can be based on
threshold-based cryptography, which enables reliable and
consistent broadcast [41] [63].
Time De-Synchronization Attacks. Usually, besides system
time, nodes in PoW and PoS maintain network time that
is computed as the median value of the time obtained
from the peers. Such a time is often put into the block
header, while nodes, upon receiving a block, validate
whether it fits freshness constraints. An attacker can
exploit this approach by connecting a significant number
of nodes and propagate inaccurate timestamps, which
can slow down or speed up the victim node’s network
time [64]. When such a desynchronized node creates a
block, this block can be discarded by a network due
to freshness constraints. To avoid de-synchronization at-
tacks, a node can build a reputation list of trusted peers or
employ a timestamping authority [65]. Another option to
improve the accuracy of block timestamps is to compute
them collaboratively by consensus nodes [18].
Double-Spending Attack. This attack is possible due to the
creation of two or more conflicting blocks with the same
height, resulting in inconsistencies called forks. Thus,
some crypto-tokens might be temporarily spent in both
conflicting blocks, while only a single block is later
included in the honest chain. A double-spending attack
mainly affects consensus protocols with slow finality.
This attack usually occurs as a consequence of 51%
attacks.3 To prevent this attack, it is recommended to wait
a certain amount of time (i.e., time to the finality) until
a block “is settled” or utilize consensus protocols with
fast time to the finality, such as BFT protocols and their
combinations.
Attacks on Shards. Sharding means that consensus nodes
are distributed among subgroups (i.e., shards) such that
each node only validates the transactions in its group.
Shards operate in parallel and can achieve higher scala-
bility and throughput since each shard has a throughput
similar to an entire non-sharded blockchain. On the other
hand, sharding has the potential to harm security because
each shard has a lower number of participating nodes
than the entire blockchain, which means that it may be
easier for the attacker to compromise a single shard than
the entire blockchain [66], [67]. In this case, the main
countermeasure is to achieve a truly random distribu-
tion of nodes among the shards, and thus minimize the
potential for adversaries to bias the randomness used
for shard distribution. For example, Elastico [68] uses
PoW to distribute nodes among shards, whereas [35] uses
a bias-resistant distributed randomness protocol (e.g.,
RandHound [69]). Poor design of sharding protocols may
also lead to vulnerabilities such as replay attacks [70].
2) Side Effects of Countermeasures: Some generic
countermeasures presented in the above text might impact the
features of the blockchains. For example, the application layer
countermeasure that uses the timestamping authority brings
centralization issues, which might impact the availability of
the service and enable misbehaving of the authority that might
provide imprecise time. To cope with this issue, instead of
using the application layer countermeasure, the computation
of the block timestamps can be embedded into the consensus
protocol, to which, multiple consensus nodes contribute at the
same time by partial solutions [18].
Enriching a fork choice rule by statistical analysis of the
history [62] might protect against sudden changes in the
3Note that in the case of PoR protocols, this attack may also occur as a
consequence of the selfish mining attack.
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distribution of the overall consensus power (e.g., rent-and-
attack in PoW protocols), but not against a slow gradual
increase of the consensus power by a coalition. Furthermore,
this mitigation technique incentivizes consensus nodes to use
the stable identifications (i.e., the same key pairs) to increase
the difficulty of the honest chain and thus the chances that
it will win over the malicious chain. This might partially
impact the privacy and security of consensus nodes, which are
disincentivized to rotate keys. Note that some privacy issues
can be resolved at the RSM layer (see Section VII).
Using the BFT consensus protocols helps to significantly
decrease a likelihood of double-spending attacks but on the
other hand, it exacerbates scalability of the blockchain and
thus throughput, especially in the case of a high number of
consensus nodes. These issues can be resolved by combining
a BFT voting protocol with lottery-based protocols that reduce
the size of the actively communicating nodes to a small
committee [31], [32], [33], [34], [29].
Distributed randomness protocols and PoW for distribution
of shards bring additional overheads, which might result in
reduced throughput of blockchains; however, it is negligible
in contrast to the throughput improvement due to sharding.
B. Proof-of-Resource Protocols (PoR)
Protocols from this category require nodes to prove the
spending of a scarce resource in a lottery-based fashion [19].
Scarce resources may stand for: (1) Computation that is
represented by Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocols (e.g., Bitcoin,
Ethereum). (2) Storage used in the setting of Proof-of-Space
protocols [71] (e.g., Spacecoin [72], SpaceMint [73]). (3)
Crypto-tokens spent for Proof-of-Burn protocols [74] (e.g.,
Slimcoin [75]). (4) Combinations and modification of the
previous types, such as storage and computation, called Proof-
of-Retrievability (e.g., Permacoin [76]) and storage over time,
which is represented by Proof-of-Space protocols (e.g., File-
coin [77]). Another hybrid example of this category is a com-
bination of PoR with elapsed time, such as in PeerCoin [78].
However, it is a philosophical question whether we consider
elapsed time as a resource that is spent or as a stake that is
invested – note that literature often categorizes PeerCoin as
the first instance of a (hybrid) PoS protocol, hence we incline
towards the second option.
PoR protocols belong to the first generation of consensus
protocols, and they are mostly based on Nakamoto Con-
sensus [17] that utilizes PoW, inheriting its pros (e.g., high
scalability) and cons (e.g., low throughput). For the detailed
analysis of several PoW designs, we refer the reader to [79].
1) Pros: In PoR protocols, malicious overriding of the
history of the blockchain (or its part) requires spending at least
the same amount of resources as was spent for its creation.
This is in contrast to principles of PoS protocols, where a big
enough coalition may override the history at almost no cost.
2) Cons: PoR protocols imply high operational costs.
Moreover, these protocols provide only probabilistic finality,
which enables attacks forking the last few blocks of the chain.
3) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present
a taxonomy of the attacks related to PoR protocols, their
origins, and defenses against them in Figure 10, while we
list several real-world incidents in Table IV of Appendix. In
the following, we describe these attacks as well as possible
defense techniques.
Selfish Mining: In selfish mining [80],4 an adversary at-
tempts to privately build a secret chain and reveal it
to the public only when an honest chain is “catching
up” with the secret one. The longest chain rule causes
honest miners to adopt the attacker’s chain and invalidate
the honest chain, thus wasting their consensus power.
This attack is more efficient when the consensus power
of a selfish miner reaches some threshold (e.g., 30%).
The selfish mining strategy was later generalized [82]
and extended to other variants that increase the profit of
the attacker [83]. Countermeasures: (1) For the case of
the longest chain rule, the first introduced mitigation is
uniform tie breaking [80], which tells consensus nodes
to choose the chain to extend uniformly at random,
regardless of which one they received first. However, this
technique is less effective when assuming network de-
lays [82]. (2) As the longest chain rule enables this attack,
it is recommended to use other fork choice rules that also
account for the quality of solutions and make the decision
deterministic, as opposed to a uniform tie breaking. An
example of such a rule is to select the block based on
the smallest hash value. Another example is to include
partial solutions [25], [84], [18] or solutions representing
full (orphaned) blocks [23], [85] for computation of a
chain quality. These partial or orphaned solutions can
be incentivized by rewards to further improve decen-
tralization. (3) Another option for a deterministic fork
choice rule is using a pseudo-random function [86], which
moreover provides unpredictability,5 hence an attacker
cannot determine his chances to win a tie. (4) PoW
protocols can be combined with BFT protocols, where
PoW is used only for joining the protocol and BFT for
consensus itself (e.g., [35], [36], [86], [34], [68]).
Feather Forking: In this attack [87], the adversary creates in-
centives for rational miners to collectively censor certain
transactions. Before a mining round begins, an adversary
announces that he will not extend the block containing
blacklisted transactions, and thus will attempt to extend
a forked chain. Although this strategy is not profitable
for the adversary and the success rate is dependent on
his consensus power, rational nodes prefer to join the
censorship to avoid the potential loss. Countermeasures:
design-oriented protection is to minimize the chance of
the attacker being successful, which can be done by
including (and rewarding) partial solutions [25], [88],
4Note that selfish mining is theoretically possible even in PoS proto-
cols [81], but requiring them to have predictable randomness for the leader
election, which is usually a design-oriented vulnerability (see Section III-C).
However, in PoR, selfish mining is possible even with unpredictable random-
ness for the leader election.
5As opposed to uniform-tie breaking that provides only unpredictability,
this solution brings determinism additionally to unpredictability.
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Figure 10: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of PoR protocols (consensus layer).
[84], [18] or full orphaned blocks [23], [85] into branch
difficulty computation.
Bribery Attacks: Whereas feather forking involves adver-
saries who try to influence the behavior of miners by
threatening to hurt their profits, bribery attacks involve the
offering of direct rewards to miners. For example, con-
sensus nodes could be bribed to enable double-spending
attacks [89] or to reorder transactions within a block, and
thus enable the transaction front-running by other means
than natural priority gas auctions (PGAs) [90].6
Countermeasures: assuming that the miners who accept
bribes constitute a minority, a possible mitigation tech-
nique is to utilize partial solutions [18], [25], [88], [84],
which reduce the likelihood that the double-spending
attacks succeed. Regarding “bribed” transaction front-
running, the misbehavior happens entirely off-chain since
miners have complete control over the transaction order-
ing process, so on-chain mitigation is challenging. More-
over, the likelihood of this attack is directly proportional
to the consensus power of the bribed miner; hence, this
attack is more feasible for mining pools. However, since
6In PGAs, users (arbitrage bots) compete with each other to be the first to
interact with a smart contract (e.g., due to profit from intra-chain exchanges
– see Section VIII-B).
no evidence confirming collusion between mining pools
and bots has been found yet, mining pools are likely to
be discouraged from accepting bribes due to the fear of
consequences (e.g., a decrease in the market value of the
crypto-tokens upon the public disclosure of these attacks).
Time-Spoofing Attacks: Time spoofing attacks target a time-
based difficulty computation algorithm of PoR protocol
with the intention to decrease the difficulty of the puzzle
and thus minimizing effort for obtaining the same reward.
In particular, the attacker is a consensus node that mines
blocks with delayed timestamps, which indicates that a
puzzle is too hard to meet block creation rate, and there-
fore difficulty needs to be decreased. Countermeasures:
A solution that improves the accuracy of the timestamps
may utilize partial solutions found by all nodes into
an averaged timestamp computation [18]. Note that the
impact of time spoofing attack might be significant also
at the application layer of SRA, especially in use cases
that rely on a timestamp accuracy (see Section VIII-F).
Pool Specific Attacks: Since PoR protocols are usually
based on a lottery having a single winner [17], re-
wards for participation impose a high payout variance
for solo miners (i.e., once in a few years). As a conse-
quence, mining pools emerged and caused centralization
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of the mining power, which may result in selfish mining,
double-spending, or 51% attacks. Countermeasures: Non-
outsourceable scratch-off puzzles [60] avoid the creation
of pools but require each consensus node to meet high
demands on connectivity and storage, as opposed to cen-
tralized pools, where only a pool operator needs to meet
these demands. If pools are acceptable, their size can be
controlled by protocols that reward partial solutions [25],
[88], [84], [18] and thus minimize payout variance. For a
detailed analysis of rewarding schemes in pools, we refer
the reader to [91]. In the following, we describe several
types of pool-specific attacks.
a) Pool Hopping. The individual contribution of min-
ers in a pool is proved by broadcasting partial solu-
tions, called shares. If pay-per-share (PPS) rewarding is
employed (i.e., pool operator instantly rewards miners
showing shares), an attacker may jump into another
pool after his mining time in a victim pool reaches a
certain threshold [92]; mining at the early stages of a
round is statistically more profitable than mining at the
end of the round. As a countermeasure pay-per-last-N-
shares (PPLNS) scheme and its variants [93] can be used.
PPLNS removes the concept of rounds and instead of
immediate payments, it employs deterred payments after
N shares submitted by a miner.
b) Block Withholding. An attacker may try to sabotage
a victim pool – after mining a block in a victim pool,
the attacker discards this block and continues mining
at another pool [91]. Such withholding does not mean
a direct gain for the attacker, but she may do a se-
cret agreement with concurrent pool(s) that may reward
the attacker for showing a withheld block [94] (a.k.a.,
sponsored block withholding). Mitigation for this kind
of attack is (1) using of PPLNS scheme, (2) giving an
extra reward to a miner of the block [95], (3) precluding
miners from distinguishing between the share and a full
solution (i.e., oblivious tasks). An example is represented
by commitments specifying “the part of the expected
solution,” which is broadcast by the pool operator to the
network at the beginning of each round [94].
c) Lie-in-Wait. If the miner finds a block in a victim pool,
he does not immediately submit it to the pool operator,
but instead focuses all his available mining power to the
victim pool in order to increase his relative shares within
a pool; after some time attacker releases the formerly
found block. A countermeasure for this attack can be to
use oblivious tasks – the miner is unable to distinguish
between the full solution and share, e.g., [94].
d) Selfish Mining on a Subchain. Decentralized mining
pools, such as p2pool [96], achieve decentralization by
updating an intermediary coinbase transaction with mined
shares. To preserve consistency with the previous versions
of the coinbase transaction within a mining round, its
history is kept in a subchain. However, a chaining data
structure enables selfish mining on a subchain, besides
the fact that it implies a high stale rate of shares in a
BFT
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Figure 11: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of BFT protocols
(consensus layer).
subchain.7 A possible countermeasure is to use flat data
structures for an aggregation of shares, such as a Merkle
tree or hash of a set [18].
4) Side Effects of Countermeasures: We are not aware
about negative effects of the previously stated countermeasures
on the blockchain features. On the other hand, rewarding
partial solutions, apart from mitigating some threats, helps to
promote decentralization – payout variance is decreased and
thus mining pools are not needed in some cases and in other
cases they can be much smaller [18].
C. Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) Voting Protocols
BFT protocols represent voting-based [19] consensus pro-
tocols that utilize Byzantine agreement and a state ma-
chine replication [37]. These protocols assume a fully
connected topology, broadcasting messages, and a master-
replicas hierarchy. Synchronous examples of this category
are PBFT [26], RBFT [27], eventually synchronous ex-
amples are BFT-SMaRt [97], Tendermint [28], Byzantine
Paxos [98], BChain [30], and asynchronous examples are
SINTRA [41] and HoneyBadgerBFT [63]. For more details,
we refer the reader to a review of BFT protocols and their
practical applications in both permissioned and permissionless
blockchains [99].
1) Pros: BFT protocols provide high throughput and
fast finality. To face their scalability limitation, BFT protocols
are often combined with PoS or PoR. This is in line with
a lottery approach [19] for selecting a portion of all nodes,
referred to as a committee, which further runs BFT consensus
(e.g., Algorand [31], Zilliqa [34], DFINITY [33]).
2) Cons: The main con of traditional BFT proto-
cols [98], [26] is low scalability caused by a high communica-
tion complexity (i.e., Θ(n2)). Since these protocols can work
efficiently only with a limited number of consensus nodes,
they can be used in their pure form only in permissioned
blockchains.
3) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of the attacks related to BFT protocols, their origins,
and defenses against them in Figure 11. In the following, we
describe these attacks as well as possible defense techniques.
Denial of Service on a Leader: Since BFT protocols are
mostly intended for (private) permissioned blockchains
that are run by trusted participants, they do not assume the
existence of malicious nodes whose goal is to sabotage
the protocol. However, assuming such an adversary, a
leader of the round might be DoS-ed since her leadership
is known before the round starts, which causes a restart
of the round. Moreover, this might be repeated until the
7Note that the same applies for Flux [25] and Subchains [88] that maintain
a subchain but at the level of the whole network (as opposed to the level of
the pool).
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adversary’s desired nodes are elected. Countermeasures:
To prevent this attack, a node can privately determine
whether it is a potential leader by using Verifiable Ran-
dom Function (VRF) [31], and immediately release a
block candidate; hence, after publishing this data, it is
too late for a DoS attack on the node.
4) Side Effects of Countermeasures and Features of
Blockchains: We are not aware about the negative effects
of the previously stated countermeasure on the blockchain
features. On the other hand, the issues with scalability and
throughput of BFT protocols can be resolved by applying
cryptographic constructs [100], [101], [102] and partitioning
consensus nodes into shards that process transactions in paral-
lel [35], [36]. Another option is to prune the number of nodes
running BFT into committees [31], which, however, reduces
the security level of BFT and provides only probabilistic
security guarantees depending on the committee size.
D. Proof-of-Stake Protocols (PoS)
Similar to the PoR category, PoS protocols are based on
the lottery approach [19]. However, in contrast to PoR, no
scarce resource is spent; instead, the nodes are required “to
prove investment” of crypto-tokens to participate in a protocol,
and thus eventually earn interest from the invested amount.
The concept of PoS was for the first time proposed in the
Bitcointalk forum [103]. The first technical realization of PoS
is Peercoin [78], which is a combination with PoW – each
node has its particular difficulty for PoW, which is based
on the age of the coins a node owns. Although there exist
a few pure PoS protocols (e.g., Chains of Activity [104],
Ouroboros [21]), the trend is to combine them in a hybrid
setting with PoR (e.g., Proof-of-Activity [105], Peercoin [78],
Snow White [106]) or BFT protocols (e.g., Algorand [31]).
In particular, a combination of PoS with BFT represents a
promising approach, which takes advantage of both lottery and
voting (i.e., scalability and throughput), while no resources are
wasted.
1) Pros: The main feature of PoS protocols, as
compared to PoR, is their energy efficiency. Although some
PoS protocols are often combined with a PoR technique
(e.g., [106], [78]), the overall energy spent is much smaller
than in the case of pure PoR protocols.
2) Cons: The introduction of PoS protocols has brought
PoS specific issues and attacks, while these protocols are still
not formally proven to be secure. Next, PoS protocols are
semi-permissionless – a node needs to first obtain a stake from
any of the existing nodes to join the protocol.
3) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of the attacks related to PoS protocols, their origins,
and defenses in Figure 12. In the following, we describe these
attacks as well as possible defense techniques.
Nothing-at-Stake: Since generating a block in PoS does not
cost any energy, a node can extend two or more conflict-
ing blocks without risking its stake, and hence increase its
chance to be rewarded. Such behavior increases the num-
ber of forks and thus time to finality. Countermeasures:
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(consensus layer).
Deposit-based solutions (e.g., [61]) require nodes to make
a deposit during some fixed period/round and checkpoint-
based solutions (e.g., [61], [78], [32], [107]) employ
“state freezing” at periodic snapshots of the blockchain,
while the blockchain can be reversed maximally up to the
recent checkpoint. Another option is to punish a node that
signs two conflicting blocks by embedding cryptographic
solutions [108] that enable anybody to reveal the identity
and a private key of such a node. Another countermeasure
is to use backward penalization of nodes that produced
two or more conflicting chains [32], [61]. Finally, PoS
protocols can be combined with BFT approaches, and
thus forks can hardly occur (e.g., [31]).
Grinding Attack: If the leader or committee producing a
block is determined before the round starts, then the
attacker can bias this process to increase his chances
of being selected in the future. For example, if a PoS
protocol takes only a hash of the previous block for the
election process, the leader of a block may bias a hash
value by suitably adjusting the content of the block in a
few attempts. Countermeasures: The grinding attack can
be prevented by performing a fresh leader election by an
interaction of consensus nodes within some committee
(e.g., the secure multiparty coin-flipping protocol [21]) or
by privately checking whether the VRF output is below
a certain stake-specific threshold (e.g., [31]). The input
of the VRF is the user’s private key and the randomness
unambiguously bound to the previous block; hence each
consensus node might compute the only VRF output
during each round.
Denial of Service on a Leader/Committee: Alike in BFT
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protocols (see Section VI-C), if a leader or a committee
is publicly determined before the round starts [21], then
the adversary may conduct a DoS attack against them
and thus cause a restart of the round – this might
be repeated until adversary’s desired nodes are elected.
Countermeasures: A prevention technique was proposed
in Algorand [31] – a node privately determines whether
it is a potential leader (or committee member), and
immediately releases a block candidate (or a vote) –
hence, after publishing this data, it is too late for a DoS
attack. The concept of the VRF was also utilized in other
protocols (e.g., [109], [33]).
Long-Range Attack: In this attack [110] (a.k.a., posterior
corruption [32]), an adversary can “bribe” previously
influential consensus nodes to sell their private keys or
steal the private keys by other means. Since consensus
nodes may exchange their crypto-tokens for fiat money
anytime, selling their keys imposes no expenses and
risk. If the attacker accumulates keys with enough stake
in the past, he may rerun the consensus protocol and
rewrite the history of the blockchain. A variant of long-
range attack that considers only transaction-fee-based
rewarding and infrequent or no check-points is denoted
as a stake-bleeding attack [111]. Countermeasures: One
mitigation is to lock the deposit for a longer time than
the period of participation in the consensus [112]. The
next mitigation technique is frequent periodic checkpoint-
ing, which causes the irreversibility of the blockchain
with respect to the last checkpoint. Another option is
to apply key-evolving cryptography [113] and forward-
secure digital signatures [114], which require users to
evolve their private keys, while already used keys are
erased [109]. Hence, signatures cannot be forged in the
case of compromise. The third mitigation technique is
enforcing a chain density in a time-domain [111] for
the protocols where the expected number of participants
in each round is known (e.g., [21]). The last mitigation
technique is context-sensitive transactions, which put the
hash of a recent valid block into a transaction itself [111].
4) Side Effects of Countermeasures: Some countermea-
sures for threats in PoS protocols might impact the features of
the blockchains. We note that secure multiparty coin-flipping
protocol brings requirements on additional interactions among
the consensus nodes, and thus it deteriorates the throughput
of the protocol. On the other hand, the throughput is not
deteriorated when the leader and the committee are elected
non-interactively by VRF.
VII. REPLICATED STATE MACHINE LAYER
Replicated State Machine (RSM) layer is responsible for the
interpretation and execution of transactions that are already
ordered by the consensus layer. Concerning security threats
for this layer are related to the privacy of users, privacy and
confidentiality of data, and smart contract-specific bugs. We
split the security threats of the RSM layer into two parts:
standard transactions and smart contracts.
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Figure 13: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of privacy threats
(RSM layer).
A. Transaction Protection
Transactions containing plain-text data are digitally signed
by private keys of users, enabling anybody to verify the
validity of transactions with the corresponding public keys.
However, such an approach provides only pseudonymous
identities that can be traced to real IP addresses (and some-
times to identities) by a network-eavesdropping adversary, and
moreover it does not ensure the confidentiality of data [115].
Therefore, several blockchain-embedded mechanisms for the
privacy of data and user identities were proposed in the liter-
ature, which we further elaborate on. Note that some privacy-
preserving techniques can be applied also on the application
layer of our stacked model but imposing higher programming
overheads and costs (e.g., see Section IX-A, Section IX-F,
and Section IX-G). This is common in the case of blockchain
platforms that do not support them natively.
1) Security Threats and Countermeasures: We present
a taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the privacy of transaction data and user identities in Figure 13.
Privacy Threats to User Identity. In most of the
blockchains, user identities can be linked with their
transactions by various deanonymization techniques,
such as network flow analysis, address clustering, or
transaction fingerprinting [115], [116], [117]. Moreover,
blockchains designed with anonymity and privacy
features (e.g., Zcash, Monero) are also vulnerable to a few
attack strategies [118], [119]. Countermeasures: Various
means are used for obfuscating user identities, including
centralized [120], [121] and decentralized [122], [123],
[124] mixing services, ring signatures [125], and non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs) [126], [127].
Some mixers enable internal linkability by involved
parties [122] or linkability by the mixers [120], which
are also potential threats. Unlinkability for all parties can
be achieved by multiparty computation (MPC) [124],
blinding signatures [121], or layered encryption [123].
Ring signatures provide unlinkability to users in a
signing group [125], enabling only the verification of
16
correctness of a signature, without revealing an identity
of a signer.
Privacy of data. Blind signatures [128] and NIZKs such as
zk-SNARKs [127] and bulletproofs [129] can be used
for the preservation of data privacy. Another method is
homomorphic encryption, which enables the computa-
tion of certain operations over encrypted messages (e.g.,
ElGamal encryption provides additive homomorphism).
Privacy and confidentiality for smart contract plat-
forms can be achieved through trusted transaction man-
agers [130] utilizing zk-SNARKs, trusted hardware [131],
and secure multiparty computations [132] embedded into
these platforms. Privacy of data can be achieved even
on blockchain platforms without embedded support of
privacy-preserving constructs. For example, Zether [133]
is built on top of the public smart contract platform
Ethereum, and it provides a confidential payment mech-
anism that embeds the balance of users into (secret)
exponents of ElGamal encryption. Other similar examples
that deal with the privacy of data at the application layer
of our stacked model are presented in Section IX-A,
Section IX-G, Section IX-F.
2) Side Effects of Countermeasures: Since protocols of
mixing services usually contain a few rounds (that may involve
the creation of several transactions), all mixing services slow
down the transaction throughput. The next blockchain feature
that is influenced by some mixers is decentralization. As
a consequence, centralized mixing services may misbehave
and reveal linkable information of transactions, they can be
DoS-ed, or they can steal the funds. Accountability for the
misbehavior of centralized mixing service is provided in Mix-
Coin [120] and Blindcoin [121] while the latter additionally
provides internal unlinkability by a mixing service. In contrast
to centralized mixers, decentralized mixers remove a trusted
third party (i.e., no theft is possible) and provide stronger
guarantees for unlinkability of transactions, e.g., CoinShuf-
fle [123] and CoinParty [124] require at least two and 23m
honest participants, respectively, to provide full unlinkability.
Decentralization and availability are also impacted in solutions
that utilize trusted hardware [130], [131].
The throughput of blockchains is also impacted in crypto-
graphic countermeasures such as NIZKs, ring signatures, and
blinding signatures. Ring signatures cause the large transaction
size, which is linear with the number of participants in the
anonymity set. The size of the ring signatures was optimized
by cryptographic accumulators in [134], which in turn en-
abled the improvement of the throughput. NIZKs utilized in
ZeroCoin [126] produce large proofs as well. The proof size
(and thus throughput) was further optimized by zk-SNARKs
in ZeroCash [127]. However, the disadvantage of zk-SNARKs
is the requirement on a trusted setup. This requirement is
eliminated in Bulletproofs [129], which further decrease the
size of proofs in transactions and thus improves on throughput.
B. Smart Contracts
Smart contracts introduced to automate legal contracts, now
serve as a method for building decentralized applications on
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blockchains. They are usually written in a blockchain-specific
programming language that may be Turing-complete (i.e.,
contain arbitrary programming logic) or only serve for limited
purposes. In the following, we describe these two contrasting
types of smart contract languages and their security aspects.
1) Security Threats and Countermeasures: We present
a taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses inherent
to smart contract platforms in Figure 14.
Turing-Complete Languages. An important aspect of this
smart contract language category is a large attack surface
due to the possibility of arbitrary programming logic.
Examples of this category are Serpent Vyper, Yul, Flint,
LLL, and Solidity, while as of now Solidity is the most
popular and widely-used one. Serpent8 is a high-level
language that was designed to be simple and similar to
the Python language. However, Serpent was designed in
an untyped fashion, lacking out-of-bound access checks
of arrays and accepting invalid code by compilers [135],
which opened the door for plenty of vulnerabilities.
Hence, Serpent showed to be an unsuccessful attempt
to simplify the coding phase. Vyper9 is an experimental
language designed to ease the audit of smart contracts
and increase security – it contains strong typing, bounds
checks, and overflows. Yul10 is a typed intermediate lan-
guage for Ethereum, which can be compiled to bytecode
for the EVM 1.0, EVM 1.5 and eWASM platforms.
Snippets of Yul code can be inserted as an inline assembly
within Solidity code to perform optimizations that are
applicable for these three platforms. Flint [136] is a
type-safe language for Ethereum smart contracts. The
major focus of this language is its robustness, and it also
provides some special features such as caller protection,
which can help to produce robust contracts. Lisp Like
Language (LLL)11 is a low-level language that is similar
to Assembler. It aims to be simple and to support the
creation of clean code; for example, it removes the need
to code the stack and jump management. Moreover, it
enables a focus on the resource-constrained nature of
Ethereum and allows optimized use of the resources.
8https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Serpent-%5BDEPRECATED%5D
9https://vyper.readthedocs.io/en/v0.1.0-beta.9/
10https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.10/yul.html
11https://lll-docs.readthedocs.io/
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Solidity12 is an object-oriented statically-typed language
that is primarily used by the Ethereum platform. Contracts
written in Solidity can contain various types of vulnera-
bilities [137], [138], [139], which resulted in many inci-
dents in the past. Table V of Appendix outlines the most
prominent incidents and the associated vulnerabilities. In
addition, the table classifies vulnerabilities according to
an existing smart contract weakness classification (SWC)
registry [140].13
Countermeasures: Mitigation techniques for such vulner-
abilities can be realized by applying static or dynamic
analysis (testing) tools, formal verification tools, security
audits, as well as respecting best practices and utilizing
known design patterns [140], [141]. Tools for smart
contract analysis are intended for the detection of various
vulnerabilities. For the survey of such tools, we refer the
reader to the associated literature [142], [143]. In the
following, we give an overview of the most important
tools in this category:
• Static analysis tools such as linters, try to find vul-
nerabilities by inspecting the source code. For exam-
ple, SmartCheck [144], Solhint,14 Solium [145], and
Slither15 belong to this category. Another example,
sCompile [146], works statically, but it also includes a
dynamic component.
• Dynamic analysis tools seek for vulnerabilities while
executing the code of smart contracts. For example,
simple forms of dynamic analysis are unit testing
with hand-crafted tests or replay testing [147], where
existing executions (or manually captured ones) are
used to check if the same results can be reproduced.
A more automated form of testing is fuzzing [148],
which generates unexpected, undefined, random, or
invalid inputs to trigger a crash or reveal defects
and vulnerabilities. Fuzzers, like ContractFuzzer [149],
Echidna,16 and Harvey [150] can be used for automated
smart contract testing as well. Another technique of
dynamic analysis is symbolic execution [151], where
a program is executed with symbolic values (i.e.,
logical expressions) that make it possible to explore
all reachable paths of a program. For this technique,
there are tools like Securify [152], Manticore [153],
Oyente [154], and Osiris [155].
• Formal verification tools usually apply an abstract
model or a semantic definition to check for the se-
curity and/or correctness properties of smart contracts.
One type of this category is represented by semantic-
based approaches that work with a semantic language
specification defining the expected behavior of smart
contracts. Examples of this type are FSolidM [156],
and Kevm [157]. Other types of formal verification
12https://solidity.readthedocs.io/
13Note to the best of our knowledge, for some vulnerabilities there are
no publicly available references on incidents supporting the existence of
vulnerabilities.
14https://github.com/protofire/solhint
15https://github.com/crytic/slither
16https://github.com/crytic/echidna/
tools are semantic-based approaches that work with
a behavioral model [158]. Several formal verification
methods [159], [160], [161] apply abstract models
(e.g., finite state machines) that define the expected
states and outputs of smart contracts for a given input.
The underlying models are used for checking the
functional correctness or the presence of vulnerabilities
(e.g., Zeus [162]). Additionally, such models can be
applied to proving certain security properties [163].
• Decompiling tools. The source code of contracts is of-
ten not public in contrast to their bytecode. For this rea-
son, bytecode decompilers, like Erays [164], Eveem,17
or Porosity [165] can be used to (partially) reconstruct
the source code of a contract. Additionally, there exist
various static bytecode analyzers, like Maian [166],
MadMax [167], Vandal [168], and automated exploit
generators, like teether [169] that can be utilized to
find vulnerabilities in the bytecode.
Turing-Incomplete Languages. The main pro of this cate-
gory is its design-oriented goal of a small attack surface
and the emphasis on safety, but it is achieved at the
cost of limited expressiveness. Examples of this cate-
gory are Pact, Scilla, Bitcoin Script, Ivy, and Simplic-
ity. Pact [170] is a declarative language intended for
the Kadena blockchain and provides type inference and
module-guarded tables to prevent direct access to the
module. Pact is equipped with the ability to express
and check properties of its programs, also leveraging
satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solvers. Scilla [171]
is designed to achieve expressiveness and tractability
while enabling formal reasoning about contract behavior.
Every computation utilizes an automata-based model, and
computations are realized as standalone atomic transitions
that strictly terminate. Scilla enables external calls only in
the last instruction of a contract, which simplifies proving
safety and thus mitigates a few vulnerabilities. Bitcoin
Script [172] is a stack-based language for the Bitcoin
platform. It has limited complexity and processing re-
quirements, and its main purpose is transaction process-
ing. Ivy is a high-level declarative predicate language for
the Bitcoin platform. It can be compiled to a Bitcoin
script and its main advantage is its comprehensibility,
which enables fast writing and an easy understanding of
the code. Simplicity [173] is a typed functional language
that works with combinators. It is equipped with (formal)
denotational and operational semantics, which facilitate
the estimation of the required computing resources.
2) Side Effects of Countermeasures: Since all of the
smart contract related countermeasures are performed before
the deployment of smart contracts as part of the development
stage of the blockchain-based applications, they do not neg-
atively impact any blockchain features. Note that only the
countermeasures related to the operational stage of blockchain-
based applications might influence blockchain features.
17https://eveem.org/
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Figure 15: Hierarchy in inheritance of security aspects across
categories of the application layer. Dotted arrows represent
application-specific and optional dependencies.
VIII. APPLICATION LAYER: ECOSYSTEM APPLICATIONS
We present a functionality-oriented categorization of the
applications running on or utilizing the blockchain (see Fig-
ure 15), in which we depict hierarchy in the inheritance of
security aspects among particular categories. In this catego-
rization, we divide the applications into categories according to
the main functionality/goal that is to be achieved by using the
blockchain. Security threats of this layer are mostly specific
to particular types of applications. Nevertheless, there are
a few application-level categories that are often utilized by
other higher-level applications. In the current section, we
isolate such categories into a dedicated application-level group
denoted as an ecosystem, while we describe the rest of the
applications in Section IX. The group of ecosystem appli-
cations contains five categories: (1) crypto-tokens and wal-
lets, (2) exchanges, (3) oracles, (4) filesystems, (5) identity
management, and (6) secure-timestamping. We accompany
the application layer with several incidents in Table VI of
Appendix.
A. Crypto-Tokens & Wallets
Besides blockchains that provide cryptocurrencies with na-
tive crypto-tokens, there are blockchain applications that use
crypto-tokens for the purpose of providing owners with rights
against a third party (i.e., counter-party tokens) or with the
possibility of transferring asset ownership (i.e., ownership/col-
ored tokens) [174]. All types of tokens require the protection
of private keys and secrets linked with user accounts. For
this purpose, two main categories of wallets have emerged:
self-sovereign wallets (a.k.a., non-custodial) and hosted wal-
lets [175], [176]. All crypto-tokens are exposed to technical
and regulatory risks, while non-native tokens are also exposed
to legal risks [174].
Self-Sovereign Wallets. Users of self-sovereign wallets lo-
cally store their private keys and directly interact with the
blockchain platform using these keys, while they verify the
inclusion of their transactions by SPV client software. The
instances of these wallets differ in several points. One of
them is the manner in which the keys are isolated – there are
software wallets that store the keys within the user PC (e.g.,
Bitcoin Core,18 MyEtherWallet19) as well as hardware wallets
that store keys in sealed storage, while they expose only
signing functionality (e.g., Trezor,20 Ledger21). The next type
of wallets enables functionality and security customization
through a smart contract (e.g., TrezorMultisig2of3,22 Ethereum
MultiSigWallet,23 SmartOTPs [177]).
Hosted Wallets. Hosted wallets require a centralized party,
which provides an interface for interaction with the wallet and
the blockchain. If a hosted wallet has full control over private
keys, it is referred to as a server-side wallet (e.g., Coinbase24),
while in the case when keys are stored in the user’s browser,
a wallet is referred to as a client-side wallet (e.g., Blockchain
Wallet25). We refer the reader to works [175], [177] for a
security overview of miscellaneous wallet solutions.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the crypto-token wallets category in Figure 16. Server-side
wallets pose a single-point-of-failure, which can be exploited
by external or internal adversaries, and moreover, it can be
subjected to availability attacks such as DoS. Since server-side
wallets have been the target in several security incidents [178],
[179], [180], their popularity has declined in favor of client-
side wallets. Client-side wallets do not expose private keys
to a centralized party but store it locally. Nevertheless, they
still trust in the online interface provided by such a party,
and thus their availability is dependent on this party. Other
threats with client-side wallets are client tampering and mal-
ware/keyloggers, which focus on deceiving the user while
signing a transaction or stealing the key. Possible mitigations
of these attacks include hardware wallets that display details
of transactions to the user, while the user confirms signing by
a button (e.g., Trezor, Ledger).
In contrast, self-sovereign wallets do not trust in a third
party nor rely on its availability. However, these wallets are
susceptible to key theft (i.e., malware [181], keyloggers [176],
[182]). One protection is to use a hardware wallet with a
display as described above. Another option is to protect self-
sovereign wallets by multi-factor/(-step) authentication using
multi-signatures (e.g., TrezorMultisig2of3, Ethereum Multi-
SigWallet), threshold-based cryptography [183], or air-gapped
OTPs [177]. In the case of counter-party and ownership
tokens presented at the application layer of existing public
blockchains, we emphasize the additional vulnerability caused
by trusting in the centralized party that issues such tokens
– the provided counter-party and ownership rights are only
virtual, which imposes a significant risk. While this risk
cannot be eliminated in this application scenario, a possible
mitigation technique for preventing fraudulent issuers is to use
18https://bitcoin.org/en/download
19https://www.myetherwallet.com/
20https://trezor.io/
21https://www.ledger.com/products/ledger-nano-s
22https://github.com/unchained-capital/ethereum-multisig
23https://github.com/ConsenSys/MultiSigWallet
24https://www.coinbase.com/
25https://blockchain.info/wallet/
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Figure 16: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of the crypto-token & wallets category (application layer).
decentralized reputation-based systems (see Section IX-B) and
notaries (see Section IX-D) that might be built on top of them.
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermeasures:
A disadvantage of some multi-factor authentication solutions
is that they require the execution of smart contracts, which
increases the costs and might slow down the throughput of
blockchains. In contrast, threshold-based cryptography con-
structs save these costs since they produce only a single signa-
ture, which appears as it was made by a single party. However,
threshold-based cryptography requires off-chain computation,
in which the duration of execution is dependent on the number
of co-signing parties.
Although self-sovereign wallets provide higher security in
contrast to client-side and server-side hosted wallets, they
impose overheads for storing the non-negligible part of the
blockchain (i.e., headers) to validate the inclusion of signed
transactions within their SPV client software – this is es-
pecially a concern when users have multiple SPV clients
for multiple blockchains. BTC Relay is an early attempt of
optimization that reduces storage requirement by outsourcing
the validation of transactions from source blockchain to the
target blockchain in exchange for a small fee paid for the relay
nodes that submit headers to the target blockchain. However,
the costs of BTC Relay were too high and its users tend to
rather store headers of source blockchain on their own. Zk-
relay [184] optimizes the costs by using zk-SNARKs with
batched block validation, achieving an improvement by a
factor of 187.
B. Exchanges
If the user wishes to exchange crypto-tokens, she might
either directly find a counter-party wishing to exchange the op-
posite pair or approach an exchange that might be centralized
or decentralized (DEX). In the case of centralized exchanges,
the security threats and implications are due to centralization,
and the only countermeasure is to use decentralized exchange
solutions that we further focus on.
Direct Cross-Chain Exchange with Atomic Swap. Atomic
swaps26 assume two parties owning crypto-tokens in two dif-
ferent blockchains, and these parties wish to execute exchange
atomically, i.e., either both of the parties receive the agreed
amount or neither of them. The atomic swap protocol enables
conditional redemption of the funds in the first blockchain
upon revealing the hash pre-image (i.e., secret) that redeems
the funds on the second blockchain. This protocol is based on
two Hashed Time-Lock Contracts (HTLC) that are deployed
by both parties in both blockchains, and it requires 4 transac-
tions (see details in Section B of Appendix).
Cross-Chain DEX. Although atomic swaps are, in theory, suf-
ficient means for the execution of a cross-chain exchange, the
situation is more complicated in practice. In particular, there
might not exist a contra-party exchanging the opposite pair
or the user might not be aware of it. This motivates DEXes,
which facilitate the process of maintaining and matching the
existing orders, act as a contra-party or intermediary, while
guaranteeing the fairness (e.g., Komodo27). The users match
the orders, reward DEX, and afterward perform atomic swap
on their own. If users wish to trade more obscure crypto-
tokens, for which there is no matching counter-order, DEX
may serve as a counter-party and do the atomic swap with the
user. Moreover, if the users wish to trade colored tokens for
native crypto-tokens of different blockchains (e.g., A sells an
asset for BTC and B buys it for ETH), DEX might serve as an
intermediary who executes the three-way atomic swap [185]
(see details in Appendix B).
Intra-Chain DEX. Some intra-chain DEX designs (e.g.,
Maker Market, EtherOpt, and Intrinsically Tradeable Tokens)
require parties to post buy&sell offers on the blockchain,
while smart contracts perform matches and execute trades.
However, each placing of an order or its modification requires
a payment for the inclusion of a transaction. Therefore, de-
signs with off-chain order matching became more popular;
in these designs, only trades are executed on-chain, while
26https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/Atomic Swap
27https://komodoplatform.com/atomic-swap-technology/
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Figure 17: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of the exchanges category (application layer).
orders and their matching is performed off-chain. An example
is 0x [186] protocol handling DEX of ERC20 tokens (e.g.,
applied in EtherDelta28). The next intra-chain exchange design
is known as the automated market maker (AAM) [187]. AAM
is applicable within a smart contract-based DEX that contains
deposited reserves of traded ERC20 tokens; examples are
Euler [188], Bancor [189], and Uniswap.29 AAM provides
high liquidity since users are not required to match their
orders, and they can directly do the exchange with the smart
contract.
Cross-Chain Communication. The concept of cross-chain
exchange can be further generalized into cross-chain com-
munication (CCC), which deals with the interoperability of
applications running on different blockchains. The security
aspects of CCC are very similar to the exchanges, and we refer
the interested reader to the work of Zamyatin et al. [190].
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present an
overview of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the exchanges category in Figure 17.
In centralized exchanges, threats are caused by external
and internal adversaries, and they are identical to those of
server-side hosted wallets (see Section VIII-A) since server-
side wallets always provide exchange services. So far central-
ized exchanges posed the most attractive target for adversaries
that have caused huge financial losses [191]. There are many
operation security (OPSEC) countermeasures such as multi-
factor authentication, split of the funds to hot and cold wallets,
however, none of them eliminates the single-point-of-failure
coming from the centralization. Therefore, effective mitigation
from the user point of view is to use decentralized exchange
solutions such as DEXes and atomic swaps, however, they also
contain some vulnerabilities.
Different blockchains of cross-chain decentralized (direct
and DEX-based) exchanges might have a different time to
finality, and thus the likelihood that one blockchain will
be overturned is higher than in the case of the other one.
Therefore, the number of required confirmations might be
agreed upon by involved parties beforehand. However, this
results in longer delays for the execution of the protocol
and the need for both parties to be online. In some cases,
such long delays might cause fluctuation in the exchange
rate, making the exchange not attractive at a later time. As a
28https://etherdelta.com/
29https://uniswap.io/
mitigation technique, off-chain exchanges (within side-chains)
might be used, where each blockchain is updated only with
the final transaction. Off-chain real-time exchanges might also
be achieved with the use of TEE [192] (see below). Another
mitigation for intentional delaying of the exchange by any
party is to use deposit-based bonds, which will be restored
only when a particular party acts timely.
Since intra-chain exchanges are executed in the single
blockchain, they give rise to the transaction front-running,
in which the adversary (a.k.a, arbitrage bots) front-run user
trades by transactions containing higher fees and by optimiz-
ing network latency [90]. Moreover, such adversaries might
compete with each other by “biding” a higher transaction
fee [90], which in turn targets the ordering mechanism of
the consensus layer, where miners might tend to overturn or
fork the blockchain while including only transactions with
the highest fees. A mitigation technique to these threats is
represented by context-sensitive transactions [111], which do
not allow overturning of the blockchain, only its extension.
The same effect can be achieved by partial solutions included
in branch difficulty computation [18], [25], [88], [84]. Note
that context-sensitive transactions and partial solutions are a
means of the consensus layer.
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermea-
sures: We assume centralized exchanges as the baseline that
requires only two transactions for cross-chain exchange or
one transaction for intra-chain exchange. In contrast, direct
atomic swaps require 4 transactions while three-way atomic
swaps require 6 transactions. Therefore, using these constructs
negatively affects the throughput of blockchains. Nevertheless,
the performance can be improved by off-chain execution of
atomic swaps, which provides almost immediate response,
e.g., off-chain swaps are possible in two-parties payment
channels and their extension to multiple parties known as
the lightning network [193]. Such off-chain solutions greatly
improve the scalability, since parties can transact directly and
involve blockchain consensus only when they wish to settle
their balances (e.g., once per day or week). However, to avoid
misbehavior, when a stale balance is settled, these systems
require that the parties constantly monitor the blockchain state.
Such an always-online assumption can be relaxed by employ-
ing watching services [194], [195], [196] (a.k.a., watchtowers),
which, however, usually incur additional costs.
TEE can be also utilized as an off-chain means that
improves the throughput of exchange service. For example,
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Tesseract [192] is a real-time exchange that leverages TEE for
communication with users and a target blockchain. To enter
the system, users submit time-locked refill transactions paying
to Tesseract’s controlled address in the target blockchain, and
then Tesseract uses its SPV client to verify their inclusion.
Existing users submit bid&sell requests to Tesseract, which
performs matching and executes trades within TEE. When
users want to sync with the on-chain state, they ask Tesser-
act to generate settlement transactions. Since decentralization
would be impacted by using a single service of Tesseract,
which might censor user requests, the authors incorporate the
Paxos consensus protocol among multiple mutually untrusted
Tesseract nodes; this also increases the fault-tolerance and
avoid funds of users becoming stuck in contrast to one instance
of Tesseract. We note that censorship evidence (not resistance)
could be alternatively ensured in Tesseract by smart contract-
based censorship resolution [197], which, however, implies
some extra costs for smart contract execution. Finally, TEE-
based solutions might be vulnerable to attacks on trusted
hardware. As a mitigation technique to reliance on a trusted
manufacturer of TEE, it is possible to use a quorum of several
redundant TEEs from multiple manufacturers. Furthermore,
it is important to note that the assumption about the code
executed in TEE is its bug-freeness, and thus one might not
use return-oriented programming or other techniques to ex-
filtrate sealed secrets or private parameters; this is out-of-scope
attacker model for TEE.
C. Oracles
Oracles (a.k.a., data feeds) are trusted entities that provide
plausible data that reflects the state of the world beyond the
blockchain. The authors of [198] and [199] define a few
security properties of oracles in smart contract platforms:
Authenticity: Data are authentic if they are produced by
content providers agreed by the consumers of the data.
Integrity: Provided data should not be modified nor deleted
after creation. Therefore, content providers should guar-
antee the correctness of the newly created data and
publicly prove their consistency with the past.
Confidentiality: Sometimes, input parameters may contain
confidential or private data. Therefore, an oracle should
support such parameters and their handling.
Availability: Since the execution of dependent smart contracts
relies on data feeds delivered by oracles, they need to
provide high availability.
We categorize existing oracles according to security impli-
cations into three categories. Prediction markets (e.g., Au-
gur [200], Gnosis30) were created for the purpose of trading the
outcome of events – individuals are incentivized to accurately
wager on outcomes serving as data feeds, while outcomes
are provided by either a centralized reporter or a quorum
of reporters. Centralized data feeds provide arbitrary data
from a single centralized source, and they build on existing
blockchain platforms (e.g., Oraclize,31 Town Crier [201],
30https://gnosis-pm-contracts.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
31https://www.oraclize.it/
PDFS [198]). Finally, oracle networks internally run a con-
sensus protocol for decentralized agreement on data (e.g.,
ChainLink [199], Witnet [202]).
Prediction Markets. Augur [200] is a solution designed as
the Ethereum smart contract, and it uses its own reputation
token. The user creating the market specifies a designated
reporter, who delivers the result of the event after it happens.
However, the reporter might not report the result or report
incorrect results. When the reporter does not report within the
specified time frame, Augur shifts the role of a designated
reporter on the first-come-first-serve basis. After reporting
the outcome, the Augur users have a specific time frame
to run a decentralized dispute resolution, and thus obtain a
different outcome of the event in the case of misreporting.
Augur incentivizes its users to report correct outcomes and
file disputes only in justified cases by rewards and deposit-
based bonds. Another example of prediction markets is Apollo
from Gnosis, which had originally a centralized data source
facilitated by Gnosis but was replaced by a decentralized one
in version 2.0.
Centralized Data Feeds. Oraclize enriches the data provided
to smart contracts by authenticity proofs that are built upon
various technologies such as auditable virtual machines and
trusted computing. Since authenticity proofs can be large, Ora-
clize can store these proofs in the distributed file system IPFS32
instead of directly providing them to the smart contracts. Town
Crier [201] is an approach that provides authenticated data
feeds to smart contracts by bridging them with public webs
through a TEE component. A linkage of TEE with a smart
contract is made by storing a public key (PK) of TEE at the
smart contract of Town Crier. It relies on the X.509 public
key infrastructure (PKI), due to which, the provided data are
provably authenticated. PDFS [198] allows content providers
to link their web resources with corresponding smart contracts
in the blockchain. In PDFS, the data of content providers are
managed in an auditable manner, enabling publicly-verifiable
data transparency and consistency of data with the past.
Besides content providers, PDFS introduces two entities that
arrange a smart-contract-based agreement by specifying a par-
ticular content provider required for the execution of the code
in the agreement. To ensure that updates are consistent with
the past, the authors apply a history tree data structure [203].
The authors additionally support the means to publicly prove
censorship by a content provider.
Oracle Networks. ChainLink [199] builds on top of existing
blockchains with support for smart contracts, and it distributes
the provisioning of data feeds to multiple oracle providers.
In detail, ChainLink maintains oracle providers and their
reputation, who are selected by a smart contract based on their
reputation to form an aggregated final result. When building
the final result, ChainLink discards outliers and utilizes the
BFT protocol to reach a consensus on a final aggregated
value. Witnet [202] is an approach similar to ChainLink but
in contrast to ChainLink, Witnet runs its own oracle network
with a native token. Witnesses (i.e., content providers) earn
32https://ipfs.io/
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Figure 18: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of the oracles category (application layer).
reputation points when the content that they deliver matches
with the majority’s content, and they lose reputation points
otherwise. The reputation points serve as a stake in the
consensus protocol of the oracle network, hence the higher
a node’s reputation, the higher the chance that it produces a
block. Since more witnesses might become block producers,
Witnet allows multiple chains in parallel, forming a DAG.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the oracle category in Figure 18. In the following, we describe
these threats as well as possible defense techniques.
Prediction markets may suffer from conflict-of-interest
since the creator of the market specifies a data reporter, who
might also participate in the market and later report false
data for her convenience. Since a prediction market might
yield significant financial value for the users with a “correct”
guess, the malicious reporter might bribe other reporters of
dispute resolution round and still be profitable. Therefore, the
incentive protocols of prediction markets must count on this
situation and incorporate feasible rewards for honest reporters.
Another mitigation for similar attacks is to keep reporters
accountable and maintain their reputation in a decentralized
fashion (Section IX-B), which involves identity management
and verification (see Section VIII-E).
Centralized data feeds rely on a trusted party [198],
[204] that may misbehave or accidentally produce wrong data.
For both cases, decentralized identity management can bring
accountability and reputation systems further build on it, which
disincentivizes malicious behaviors. Another option to cope
with possible misbehavior of a trusted party of oracle service
is to embed the logic of oracle service into a TEE compo-
nent [201], whose code is publicly attested. TEE component
can interact with the external world using X.509 public key
infrastructure (PKI), due to which obtained data are provably
authenticated. Since some requests of data feeds might contain
private parameters,33 they can be encrypted by a PK of the
TEE and further processed within TEE that communicates
with its remote data provider through an encrypted channel,
while communication is facilitated by oracle’s service oper-
ator, as demonstrated in Town Crier [201]. Centralized data
feeds might be subject to attacks on availability, leading to
33All transactions of permissionless blockchains are visible to public.
interrupted service. A mitigation technique is to use solutions
with a higher redundancy, such as oracle networks.
Oracle networks eliminate trust in a single party by running
a consensus protocol either natively [202] or utilizing an
existing smart contract platform to facilitate the service and
its consensus [199]. Running the native consensus protocol of
an oracle network imposes the security threats and their coun-
termeasures related to the consensus layer (see Section VI).
Specific threats to oracle networks are freeloading attacks, in
which an oracle provider might copy a publicly visible value
provided by other oracles without any effort. The authors of
ChainLink [199] propose the usage of a commitment scheme
to cope with this attack.
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermeasures:
The data provision time of prediction markets may be too long
for many applications, and they are convenient to use only for
specific use cases that are limited to provided data events.
The data provision time is prolonged even more in the case of
disputes, whose resolution may require several days or weeks.
In contrast to limited data of prediction markets, centralized
data feeds enrich the data domain and significantly shorten the
provisioning times.
In the case of oracle providers that offer authenticated
data feeds using trusted hardware [204], [201], a vulnerability
in trusted hardware (caused by a manufacturer) may result
in the entire data feed being compromised. As a mitigation
technique to reliance on a trusted manufacturer of TEE, it
is possible to use a quorum of several redundant TEEs from
multiple manufacturers. However, it is important to note that
the assumption about the code executed in TEE is its bug-
freeness, and thus one might not use return-oriented program-
ming or other techniques to ex-filtrate sealed secrets or private
parameters; this is out-of-scope attacker model for TEE.
Since ChainLink [199] is an oracle network running over the
public smart contract platform, it imposes significant execution
costs. To reduce the on-chain cost of BFT protocol execution,
the authors discuss the use of threshold-based signatures
for collective off-chain signing of the final value; however,
freeloading attacks remain unresolved in this case. When
freeloading attacks are resolved by a commitment scheme,
it negatively impacts the provisioning delay and costs for
data providers, who have to submit another transaction with a
commitment.
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D. Filesystems
Filesystems (FS) serve as a distributed data storage infras-
tructure that borrows ideas from peer-to-peer storage systems,
while additionally incentivizing data preservation by tokens.
Fully Replicated FS with Ledger. A naive approach is to
store the full content of data at the blockchain, and thus
achieve full data replication, extremely high data durability
(i.e., availability of data) as well as network expansion factor
(i.e., storage overhead). An example is storing data using
the instruction OP RETURN in Bitcoin or storing data
as key:value pairs within Namecoin.34 However, such an
approach results in high storage overheads required for full
replication of the data among the consensus nodes.
Partially Replicated FS with Ledger. To decrease the costs
while preserving reasonable durability, partial replication of
the data with erasure encoding is often used (e.g., Perma-
coin [76], Storj [205], and KopperCoin [206]). In erasure
encoding, the data block is encoded using two numbers (k, n),
where n represents the number of total erasure shares and k
represents the minimum number of shares required for data
recovery. Permacoin incorporates Proof-of-Retrievability in the
consensus layer, where consensus nodes store large segments
of data provided by an authoritative file dealer. KopperCoin
follows a similar approach, but it does not need the trusted
dealer for the initial distribution of data files since files are
uploaded by the users. Storj uses a 3rd party distributed ledger
for storage of metadata, such as file hash, network locations of
copies, and Merkle roots of data. Permacoin, KopperCoin, and
Storj enable probabilistic audits using Proof-of-Retrievability,
which proves that a node stores certain data at the time of
the challenge. Filecoin is an incentive mechanism of any
distributed FS (e.g., IPFS), and in contrast to previous works,
it can guarantee the data possession over a certain time
range in a setting of Proof-of-Spacetime. Moreover, Filecoin
uses Proof-of-Replication [207], which guarantees physically
unique copies of data for each node.
Partially Replicated FS without Ledger. IPFS and Swarm35
34https://bit.namecoin.org/
35https://swarm-guide.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
utilize the concept of distributed hash tables (DHT). DHT
provides a decentralized data lookup service with key:data
mappings, in which the set of nodes storing the data is
unambiguously determined by the key associated with the
data (i.e., its hash). Since the lookup service and data storage
are (partially) distributed, a change in the set of participants
causes only a negligible disruption of availability. IPFS does
not contain any incentive mechanism and the availability
of the data is dependent on its popularity, although deleted
data can be re-uploaded. Although IPFS does not involve a
blockchain, it may achieve its properties. In particular, nodes
may optionally store a BitSwap ledger that logs data transfers
with other nodes.
Centralized Storage of Off-Chain Data. Alternatively to
decentralized filesystems, decoupling of the data from the
blockchain itself through the storage of on-chain integrity
proofs (see Section VIII-F) and off-chain data is also an
option; however, it introduces a single-point-of-failure and
thus may not provide sufficient availability. Besides central-
ized storage of off-chain data, cloud services (e.g., AWS,
Google Cloud) are promising approaches for decentralized yet
manageable data storage, for which integrity and consistency
proofs are stored on some blockchain.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the filesystems category in Figure 19. While fully replicated
and partially replicated decentralized filesystems handle avail-
ability using decentralized infrastructure, centralized storage
with integrity proofs and cloud services relies on a centralized
provider. In a Sybil attack on a replicated FS, a malicious
node claims the storage of multiple copies of the same data.
Similarly, in a de-duplication attack, more consensus nodes
may collude to claim that each of them is storing an indepen-
dent copy of the data, while only one of the nodes stores the
data. These attacks can be prevented by a unique encoding
of each data copy proposed in Proof-of-Replication [207]. In
an outsourcing attack, a malicious consensus node claims
the storage of more data than it can physically store while
relying on data retrieval from outsourced data providers. In
a generation attack, a malicious node can re-generate the
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previously uploaded data upon request using some algorithm,
which may increase its chances to be rewarded: a node might
commit to storing of a huge volume of generated data.
On top of the unique encoding of each data copy, a
mitigation technique for outsourcing and generation attacks
is to put time constraints on the delivery of the response by
a prover, as proposed in Proof-of-Replication [207]. In detail,
the function used for the encoding of data replicas must not
be parallelizable (e.g., symmetric encryption in CBC mode) to
mitigate generation attacks. In the case of outsourcing attacks,
the time constraints must distinguish whether cloud access
was made or not. Similar mitigation for outsourcing attacks
is the use of non-outsourceable scratch-off puzzles [76], [60],
in which the computation of the puzzle requires access to the
storage in random order; hence, many round-trips are incurred
during one attempt of solving a puzzle. Another attack might
target the reputation of a network by dropping data and its
redundant copies. A simple mitigation technique is to use
multiple consensus nodes for a file upload, which diminishes
the chance of the attack being successful. Another mitigation
is to increase the durability by erasure encoding.
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermeasures:
Although unique encoding of each data copy thwarts several
attacks, on the other hand, it imposes higher overheads for
file distribution on clients, which might negatively influence
the throughput of data. Similarly, additional overheads on the
client during the file upload is imposed by the use of multiple
consensus nodes for file upload. Although erasure encoding
aims to decrease costs, it must be viewed in a trade-off with
the availability of data that is negatively affected by it.
E. Identity Management
Identity management refers to binding identities of entities
to their public keys. This concept is also referred to as Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI), and it has a few security goals [208]:
Accurate Registration: The user must be unable to register
an identity that she does not own.
Identity Retention: The user must be unable to impersonate
an identity already registered.
Censorship Resistance: The user must be able to register any
identity that she owns.
In computer science, some have conjectured that it is highly
unlikely to design an identity management system in which
identifiers would be selected in a distributed fashion while
remaining secure and human-readable. These three properties
are often referred to as Zooko’s triangle [209]. However, this
situation has been changed with the invention of blockchains;
in particular, their immutability feature (Appendix A1).
Namecoin36 is a native blockchain that facilitates identity
management since it allows for the unique registration of key :
value mappings. However, searching for a value associated
with a key requires full storage and traversal of the blockchain,
which is costly. Blockstack [210] is a similar approach as
Namecoin, providing decentralized DNS, but in contrast to
Namecoin, it off-chains the data storage of domain name
36https://www.namecoin.org/
mappings and keeps only references to hashes of zone-files in
its blockchain. Zone-files (and their referred DNS entries) are
stored off-chain. Certcoin [208] is built on top of the Namecoin
blockchain, where entities publish their public keys (PK)
by posting an identity-PK pair to the Namecoin blockchain.
Certcoin utilizes cryptographic accumulators, which represent
a space-efficient data structure that supports the verification
of set membership within the {ID, PK} domain, imposing
only a logarithmic time complexity in the number of registered
users (in contrast to linear time complexity of Namecoin). Fur-
thermore, to speed up the PK lookup queries, Certcoin lever-
ages the concept of DHT (see Section VIII-D), which enables
it to achieve a constant lookup time complexity. Ethereum
Name Service37 (ENS) maps human-readable domain names
to Ethereum addresses in a similar fashion as in DNS. The
root domain of ENS is maintained by a multi-signature smart
contract owned by trustworthy individuals from the Ethereum
community. Similarly, uPort [211] utilizes smart contracts to
keep a registry that maintains a mapping of the user addresses
to hashes of claims38 that are stored off-chain. In contrast to
ENS, uPort does not provide human-readable user identifiers
and discusses the possibility of using ENS as a naming layer.
Smart contracts for managing identities of humans, groups,
objects, and machines are also used in the ERC 725 standard,39
in which, identity is associated with several keys serving
various purposes. ShoCard [212] is another example that builds
on top of existing public blockchains, but in contrast to the
previous examples, it builds a sidechain containing encrypted
identity-specific data such as biometric data, scans of IDs,
etc. The user may then decide to whom she will reveal the
encrypted data. The Sovrin [213] is an example providing
a public permissioned blockchain that consists of consensus
nodes approved by Sovrin. It focuses on high throughput and
low operational costs. Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) [214]
represent a new type of universally unique identifiers whose
control is decentralized since all roots of trust are contained
in the blockchain and each entity might create its own root of
trust. DID employs the same hierarchical scheme for globally
unique strings as URI, and it maps strings to DID documents
containing data such as PKs, endpoints of the entity, or links to
off-chain data. Only the owner can create, manage, and prove
ownership of her DID entries.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the identity management category in Figure 20. As mentioned
by Kalodner et al. [215], most of the solutions address the
problem of mapping names to values but for identity manage-
ment, it is essential to build a mapping of entities (i.e., persons,
companies) to values. However, to establish such a mapping
in a trustworthy way, a human arbitration or a trusted party is
needed. For this purpose, oracles (see Section VIII-C) might
deliver verified data about the identity of users.
Since the space of human-readable IDs is scarce, they hold
some market value in contrast to an almost infinite number of
37https://ens.domains/
38Claims as such belong to the notaries category (see Section IX-D).
39https://erc725alliance.org/
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Figure 20: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of the identity
management category (application layer).
non-human-readable IDs, such as hashes. This opens a door
to cyber-squatting attacks, in which anybody might seize an
ID that does not belong to her and then sell the ID in the
secondary market at an inflated price. Kalodner et al. [215]
found in 2015 that from around 120, 000 registered names in
Namecoin, only 28 were not squatted and had human-readable
content. They discussed two strategies to prevent such attacks
within the primary market, in which names are issued for
the first time, as opposed to the secondary market where the
users might trade the names they already possess. These two
strategies stand for auctions and algorithmic fees, both having
their respective cons. Auctions are problematic since they may
be initiated at any time, and some potentially interested bidders
might not be available. An improvement is to specify a fixed
time when auctions start. Another approach for coping with
cyber-squatting is an algorithmic fee solution, which assigns
the price based on the deterministic observables, such as length
of the name, a rank of the domain, occurrence of human-
readable words, etc. Nevertheless, this approach may require a
data feed provider (see Section VIII-C). In contrast to human-
readable identifiers, non-human readable identifiers, such as
DIDs, do not suffer from the cyber-squatting threat.
Another challenge is a front-running attack (i.e., a MITM
attack), in which an adversary may intercept and override
the user’s transaction with a malicious transaction containing
the same domain but a higher fee. A prevention technique
is a variant of the commitment scheme where the user first
publishes a sealed (domain) name and public bid, while in the
second step she submits the plain text of the name.
Further, identity-related user data that are published on the
blockchain are subject to certain privacy issues. Mitigation
is to keep only integrity information (such as hashes) on
the blockchain, while data should be stored off-chain [212],
[210], [211] or encrypted by the user’s private key [212].
Moreover, all the approaches that rely on off-chain storage
and service provisioning are vulnerable to availability is-
sues (e.g., [211], [214]) and censorship attacks (e.g., [213]).
Mitigation that provides censorship evidence is an on-chain
censorship resolution [197].
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermeasures:
Side effects of oracles depend on their category, and we
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mention them in Section VIII-C. If a beginning time of the
auctions on the primary market is fixed, bidders can be DoS-
ed and prevented from bidding. Anonymization networks and
VPNs used by bidders might mitigate this problem. While off-
chaining of identity-related data helps to cope with privacy
issues and decreases operational costs, on the other hand, it
means dependency on centralized storage, which negatively
impacts the availability of such data. Possible mitigation
might be partially replicated decentralized filesystems (see
Section VIII-D).
F. Secure Timestamping
The role of secure timestamping is to prove that some data
existed prior to some point in time – also referred to as proof-
of-existence. In the decentralized setting of blockchains, the
blockchain serves as a trusted notary that enables such proofs
since it provides immutability of the history. Nevertheless, the
blockchain “does not understand” the semantics of data that
are timestamped, and thus it cannot vet or certify them.
The simple examples of secure timestamping are Com-
mitCoin [216], STAMPD,40 Bitcoin.com Notary,41 and Ori-
ginStamp [217], all enabling to post a document’s hash
into a single blockchain transaction. OpenTimestamps42 and
POEX.IO43 are examples that define a set of operations for
creating timestamps and their verification as part of a Merkle
tree that aggregates hashes of timestamped objects. The root
of the Merkle tree is then stored in the blockchain and later
used for verification of timestamped data.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: Figure 21 depicts
a taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related
to secure timestamping systems. Since secure timestamping
approaches have a narrow principle of operation and provided
functionality, their attack surface is very limited, too. The
main security threats stem from inaccuracy and imprecision
of timestamps provided by blockchain network as well as
aggregation delays of certain secure timestamping services.
As a consequence, the result of certain disputes might be
influenced. A possible mitigation technique to improve the
accuracy of timestamps is to use timestamping authorities [65]
or partial solutions for block timestamp computation [18].44 A
mitigation technique for long aggregation delays is to employ
timestamping authorities or use one transaction per hash of
the timestamped record. Another class of attacks concerns
40https://stampd.io/
41https://notary.bitcoin.com/
42https://opentimestamps.org/
43https://poex.io/
44Note that this is a countermeasure specific to the consensus layer.
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the availability of timestamped data, for which decentralized
filesystems might be utilized as a mitigation technique while
storing data in encrypted or plaintext form (depending on the
use case).
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermeasures:
Although one transaction per hash of a timestamped record
mitigates the impact of aggregation delays in solutions such
as OpenTimestamps and POEX.IO, on the other hand, it
requires a higher amount of data posted to blockchains, and
thus it deteriorates the throughput and imposes higher costs.
Therefore, the choice of either an aggregated solution or a
single hash per record depends on a particular use case.
IX. APPLICATION LAYER: HIGHER-LEVEL APPLICATIONS
In this section, we elaborate on more specific higher-
level applications as opposed to ecosystem applications. In
the current group of applications, we present the following
categories: (1) e-voting, (2) reputation systems, (3) data
provenance, (4) notaries, (5) direct trading, (6) escrows,
(7) auctions, and (8) general application of blockchains. In
the following, we describe each of the categories. We limit our
description only to several most common application classes.
For other detailed reviews of blockchain applications, we refer
the reader to Casino et al. [11] and Zheng et al. [12], which
in contrast to our work follow domain-oriented classification.
A. E-Voting
Kiayias et al. [218] and Groth [219] state several properties
that are desirable in e-voting applications:
Perfect Ballot Secrecy: implies that a partial tally can be
computed prematurely only if all remaining voters are
involved in its recovery.
Fairness: the final tally can be computed only when all
participants already had a chance to cast their vote.
Public Verifiability: any public observer can verify the valid-
ity of all votes and final tally. This is achieved by using a
public bulletin board (e.g., blockchain). A consequence of
the public verifiability is dispute-freeness, i.e., the result
of the voting is indisputable.
Self-Tallying: once the voting stage has finished, anyone
can compute the final tally. This property together with
fairness ensures that the last voter is unable to compute
the tally before casting her vote.
Fault Tolerance/Robustness: a voting protocol is able to
recover from a fixed number of faulty voters who do not
vote or whose vote is invalid.
Receipt-Freeness: a participant is unable to supply a receipt
of her vote after casting the vote. The goal is to prevent
vote-selling and post-election coercion.
E-voting [220], [221] has tried to mimic many of the security
properties provided by the paper voting. In the decentralized
e-voting, the protocol is carried out in phases and requires a
multiparty computation [218], [219] executed by the voters.
Decentralized voting involves an interaction among partici-
pants and is less robust concerning fault tolerance – i.e., if
voters drop out midway, a recovery round has to be initiated.
The main advantages of using the blockchain for e-voting are
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Figure 22: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of the e-voting
category (application layer).
its immutability, public verifiability, enforcing protocol rules
by the smart contract, and higher availability [222].
An example of a decentralized e-voting is the Open Vot-
ing Network (OVN) [223], which for the first time utilizes
blockchain as an instantiation of the public bulletin board.
OVN is implemented using Ethereum smart contracts, and it
enables boardroom voting of up to ∼50 voters with support
for two voting choices. OVN requires the authority to initialize
e-voting, compute multiparty keys from data submitted by
voters, and reveal the result of the final tally. However,
the authority is unable to influence the election outcome
or compromise the privacy of voters (i.e., their cast votes).
Although OVN preserves the privacy of voters and provides
self-tallying, it does not provide receipt-freeness. OVN uses
deposit-based penalties to incentivize the authority and voters
to actively participate. Zhang et al. [224] present a distributed
e-voting scheme that uses the blockchain, but the proposed
protocol requires a restart of voting if any voter does not cast
her vote. This enables sabotaging of the voting process by a
single malicious voter. Li et al. [225] propose an approach that
assumes an interactive honest verifier for the zero-knowledge
proof presented; however, the verifier can select a biased
challenge, which enables collusion of the verifier and the
authority.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the decentralized e-voting category in Figure 22. The first
e-voting-specific group of threats represents vote-selling and
post-voting coercion. In vote-selling, the voter can prove to a
briber that she voted as agreed, while in post-election coercion
the voter is coerced to show her vote by decryption of the
blinded vote. Mitigation is to use receipt-free voting protocols
in order to thwart both attacks [226], [227]. Existing solu-
tions for achieving receipt-freeness assume a secret channel
(bi-directional [226] or uni-directional [228]), use deniable
encryption [229], [230] or employ randomizers [231].
The next threat is double-voting (with Sybil accounts)
in the case of unmanaged public voting in permissionless
blockchains. To prevent double-voting and ensure that only
eligible voters can vote, it is usually required that a voting
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authority gives voters permission to vote.45 Another issue is
a possibility of (colluding) voters not vote despite enrollment,
resulting in the sabotage of the voting round (possible in [219],
[224]) or privacy issue related to more fine-grained inference
of the actual votes of the remaining voters who voted. Deposit-
based bonds might be employed as penalties for saboteurs
and disincentivize such behaviors. Another countermeasure
for saboteurs is a fault-tolerant voting protocol (e.g., [232]),
in which the remaining honest voters can recover the final
tally even without missing votes of saboteurs. Since e-voting
might assume verified identities of all participants, the next
group of threats that is worth noting is inherited from identity
management (see Section VIII-E).
The last threat relates to the self-tallying property, which
might not hold if no countermeasure is applied, as the last
participant can compute the tally and only after that decide on
her vote. Simple mitigation is to use an additional “dummy”
participant that is handled by the voting authority. Another
solution is to enforce participants to first commit to their votes
and then cast the committed votes in the later stage.
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermeasures:
Receipt-free voting protocols can protect against vote-selling
or coercion but on the other hand, they imply additional
computational overhead for voters, which increases the cost
of running a decentralized protocol. Although authority can
prevent double voting, it is trusted with managing voters
honestly and completing all actions required for progressing
the protocol from one stage to the next stage (e.g., [223]).
However, the authority represents a single-point-of-failure,
since it might disrupt the execution of the protocol. Deposit-
based bonds can be employed as a mitigation technique, or the
authority can be replaced by an arbitrary voter for the purpose
of execution of the voting protocol (but not for managing
voters). Regarding the management of voters, an important
threat is a possibility that the authority might censor some
eligible voters. A solution for eliminating the authority (or a
delegation of this problem to a different application type) is
to permit voters to vote upon successful registration of their
identities within a certain identity management application
(see Section VIII-E). Fault-tolerant voting protocols impose
additional overheads, where all remaining voters must actively
participate in the recovery round – this implies additional costs
on such voters, and it slows down the protocol. Similarly, a
commitment scheme for coping with violation of self-tallying
in the case of the last voter implies additional overheads and
costs for a dedicated commitment stage.
B. Reputation Systems
Reputation systems commonly serve as a means to (1) mea-
sure the level of trust in particular entities that provide a certain
service, (2) verify claims of user achievement or authenticity
of issued counter-party/ownership tokens. The reputation is
usually quantified based on the voting of parties/users that
independently analyze the history of interactions/records pro-
duced by entities in a reputation query.
45This is related to know your client (KYC) compliance, and it is related
to the principles of permissioned blockchains.
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Figure 23: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of the reputation
systems category (application layer).
In reputation assessment, there are two options to determine
the eligibility to rate. In the first option, an arbitrary legitimate
participant can rate a product that she has bought or a service
that she has consumed. In the second option, only a limited
number of selected participants can vote on the authenticity
of individual records (e.g., accreditation). In reputation-based
systems, identity management is two-fold since the identity of
both voters and the record owners/merchants/service providers
needs to be verified.
Rating by Arbitrary Participants. A privacy-preserving
reputation system for e-commerce was proposed in [233]. The
authors utilize blinding signatures and merchant-issued tokens
to achieve the privacy of reviews and avoid bad-mouthing and
ballot-stuffing attacks. A feedback-based reputation approach
that utilizes the incentive-based scheme of the Bitcoin network
is proposed in [234]. In this approach, any consumer might rate
the service of the producer, while obtaining a voucher for the
feedback. Zhao et al. [235] propose a reputation management
scheme that utilizes additive secret sharing to achieve the
privacy of participants in reputation assessments.
Rating by a Number of Selected Participants. An ex-
ample of such a reputation-based application is related to
accreditation of educational institutions by other higher-level
institutions and organizations [236].
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the reputation systems category in Figure 23. Specific security
threats to reputation systems with an arbitrary number of
legitimate participants are bad-mouthing, ballot-stuffing, and
whitewashing attacks [233]. In bad-mouthing attacks, the
customer (e.g., competitor) lies about the product or service,
while in the ballot-stuffing attacks, the service provider might
increase her reputation by herself. Bad-mouthing can be
mitigated by filtering only authorized participants to submit
reputation assessments (e.g., by review tokens [233], [234]).
Although bad-mouthing cannot be completely prevented, it
requires participants to spend resources (e.g., buying a product
or paying transaction fees) to be eligible for rating a service
provider. Similarly to bad-mouthing, the ballot-stuffing attack
cannot be eliminated but only mitigated by requiring to spend
resources (i.e., tokens) for each rating entry. If a service
provider accumulates a significant negative reputation, it has
an incentive for a whitewashing attack – the service provider
creates a new service with a neutral reputation, which is un-
linkable to her previous service. To mitigate this attack, oracles
for obtaining verified data about identities of entities can be
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employed, possibly as part of the identity management system.
Since reputation systems resemble e-voting in general,
concerning security threats are inherited from there (see
Section IX-A) and its dependency on identity management
(Section VIII-E). In particular, only authorized participants
are able to participate in the voting process and no duplicate
votes are allowed (ensured by identity management), while
the votes/ratings should remain blinded (ensured by e-voting)
unless the particular use case requires otherwise, e.g., rating
by a number of selected publicly known participants.
2) Side Effects of Countermeasures: Since some
countermeasures in reputation systems are inherited from
the e-voting and oracles categories, the side effects are also
inherited from these categories.
C. Data Provenance
Data provenance represents the ownership history of an
arbitrary object. However, in cyber-world, objects are repre-
sented by data that can be changed and thus the history must
account also for the modifications [237]. Data provenance with
the use of blockchains has the potential to resolve various
disputes and issues related to intellectual property, authorship,
the validity of certificates, and other issued documents and
intangible assets, etc. Data provenance assumes known verified
identities of the involved parties (see Section VIII-E).
An application of data provenance is supply-chain man-
agement [238], [239], where the goal is to resolve potential
issues in the traceability of goods and provenance of associated
data [240]. Blockcloud is an approach that utilizes blockchains
for data provenance in cloud computing [241]. The authors aim
at the accountability of data creation and manipulation with
the intention to detect malicious insiders and intrusions. The
idea of using the blockchain for tracking packages and mails
as part of supply chain management was proposed in [242].
ChainAnchor [243] is a framework for the commissioning and
decommissioning of IoT devices in a cloud-based ecosystem.
In a commissioning procedure, devices prove their manufac-
turing provenance to a verifier in a privacy-preserving fashion
without a need for interaction with the manufacturer. An
additional goal of ChainAnchor is to reward owners of IoT
devices for sharing data in a privacy-preserving manner. A
data provenance approach that focuses on the integrity of IoT-
generated data is proposed in [244]. A framework to achieve
data provenance of multimedia objects such as artworks and
books was proposed in [245]. The authors use watermarking
techniques to embed transaction metadata of objects into the
objects themselves to prove data tampering.
Catena [246] guarantees a non-equivocation of its append-
only log and relatively low storage overheads (i.e., storing
all the blockchain headers). The hash of each off-chain data
block is added to the append-only log of Catena as a single
transaction, which is bound to the previous Catena transaction.
The same method of binding consecutive transactions in an
append-only log was utilized in Contour [247]. In contrast to
general Catena, Contour focuses on non-equivocation during
the distribution of open-source software packages by a spec-
ified authority. Grech and Camilleri [236] elaborate on the
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Figure 24: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of the data
provenance category (application layer).
usage of blockchain for issuance of educational certificates
by verified academic institutions. Such certificates might be
issued by institutions whose identities are verified (see Sec-
tion VIII-E).
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to the
data provenance category in Figure 24. Since data provenance
infrastructure might involve simple IoT devices and sensors
that are often not updated or physically unprotected, it is
important to ensure that these devices are tamper-proof and
no secret can be stolen from them. As a countermeasure,
Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) may be used if they are
available. We note that the current trend is to involve TPMs at
the hardware of contemporary IoT devices. However, TPMs
are often not available in numerous legacy IoT devices. In
such cases, it is possible to leverage kernel-space and user-
space memory isolation as part of the intrusion prevention
system (e.g., [248]). Another vulnerability originates from
a possible centralized logger component of data provenance
solutions (e.g., [246], [247], [249], [250]). Hence, availability
issues for data storage must be considered and possibly
resolved by a convenient decentralized filesystem approach
(see Section VIII-D). Another threat concerning the centralized
infrastructure of loggers is the possibility of data tampering
and censorship. Data tampering can be detected by data
producers or auditors that do periodic audits [251]. To cope
with censorship, an on-chain smart contract-based censorship
resolution can be utilized [197], [250].
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermeasures:
Although auditors might detect tampering with data by a
logger entity, their periodic activity implies high operational
costs. A possible option to save such costs is an auditor-free
update of the log using a smart contract [249], alternatively
combined with TEE [250] to enforce even stronger properties
(i.e., the correctness of the logger’s execution). However, TEE
has also its cons, which we discussed above. Moreover, since
countermeasures of the data provenance category depend on
the identity management and filesystems category, the side
effects are inherited from them as well.
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D. Notaries
In contrast to secure timestamping, the role of the notary
system is not only to prove the existence of documents at cer-
tain points in time but also to vet and certify documents [252];
hence, notary systems assume known verified identities of
involved parties who do vetting (see Section VIII-E). In
addition to the above two functionalities, the definition of
the notary system involves document preservation, which,
however, in the context of the public blockchain is optional.
The involved parties may decide whether to store vetted
documents/entries in a database of a notary service provider
(e.g., [197]) or whether to keep it privately at the client-side
(e.g., Blockusign46).
A blockchain-based notarization platform on Ethereum was
proposed in the post [253], where an arbitrary number of
users/entities with verified identities may sign/approve the
documents and their new versions, respectively. The proposal
assumes a certification authority that verifies identities of
involved entities, and as an example, the authors suggest
the use of ERC 725 standard [254]. ADVOCATE [255] is
an approach for notarization of agreements about personal
data processing in IoT between owners of IoT devices and
data processing services – both must co-sign an agreement.
Mizrahi [256] proposes a system for property ownership,
where, all ownership transfers can be realized without any
trusted party, but the trusted party is required for introducing
the initial ownership record to the blockchain. The own-
ership register for vehicles was proposed by Notheisen et
al. [257], where trusted third parties, such as police depart-
ments and transport authorities provide and verify vehicle-
specific information. SilentNotary47 is a smart contract-based
system for self-certifying of files produced by registered users.
PADVA [197] is a Transport Layer Security (TLS) notary
service realized as a smart contract-based two-party agreement
(i.e., Service Level Agreement). PADVA introduces notary
entities that are obligated to periodically check the validity
of PKs in a specified set of certificates.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the notaries category in Figure 25. Notaries inherit security
threats related to timestamp accuracy from the secure times-
tamping category (see Section VIII-F). In addition, since they
assume verified identities of involved parties, they inherit
security issues from the identity management category (see
Section VIII-E). In particular, many notary services assume
a centralized identity management system, which might be
subject to tampering or censorship issues. Next, a very specific
threat to PADVA is cheating notary, who quietly does not
46https://blockusign.co/
47https://silentnotary.com/
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Figure 26: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of the direct
trading category (application layer).
run the service periodically or runs it only sporadically. Such
cheating can be revealed by clients on an ad-hoc basis, who
punish notaries by the smart contract logic that causes notaries
to lose their deposit.
2) Side Effects of Countermeasures: Since security
aspects in notaries are inherited from the secure timestamping
and identity management categories, the side effects are also
inherited from these categories.
E. Direct Trading
While blockchain-based cryptocurrencies enable native se-
cure transfers of crypto-tokens among their owners, a chal-
lenge arises when owners want to exchange crypto-tokens
they hold for goods outside of the cryptocurrency blockchain.
This challenge is also referred to as the buyer/seller dilemma:
“Should the buyer trust the seller and pay her before receiving
goods or should the seller trust the buyer and ship the goods
before receiving the payment?” In the direct trading category,
this problem is resolved directly between the buyer and
seller, without the need for a mediator, under the assumption
of a trusted seller with a verified identity. For example in
BIP-70 [258], the buyer first verifies the authenticity of the
seller using its X.509 certificate and then issues a payment
transaction.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the direct trading category in Figure 26. The first vulnerability
represents the assumption of trust in the seller. For example in
BIP-70, the buyer might ask the seller to interrupt the request
and get a refund but the seller may misbehave, and thus risk
a reputation loss; on the other hand, this might be tolerated if
the seller spoofed her identity. A mitigation technique is to use
a strong means for identity verification, including assessments
from reputation systems. Another attack on BIP-70 that is
worth mentioning is the Silkroad trader attack [259], in which
a malicious buyer might replace her refund address and then
ask the seller for a refund due to missing authentication on
the refund address. After a refund, the buyer might plausibly
deny receipt of a refund (and ask for a refund again). This
attack occurs due to a design-oriented flaw. Another potential
attack related to direct trading is double-spending performed
as part of the selfish mining or 51% attacks – therefore, it is
important to wait for enough confirmations by the seller before
releasing the goods or use consensus protocols having a fast
finality (see Section VI-A).
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermeasures:
Enough confirmations by the seller imply a long waiting time
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for the buyer before the seller releases the goods and issues
a receipt for it. In particular, this might be problematic in the
case of on-premise purchases. The waiting time is dependent
on the time to the finality of the underlying consensus protocol,
and thus a consensus protocol with a low time to finality
represents a solution. However, it is the means of the consensus
layer (see Section VI).
F. Escrows
Escrows address the same problem as direct trading but in
contrast to direct trading, escrows do not assume a trusted
seller; instead, escrows outsource the trust into the third
party, referred to as a mediator. The mediator might actively
participate in the escrow protocol or she might be involved
only in the case of a dispute. According to the decentralization
of the mediator, escrow protocols can be split into single me-
diator protocols and protocols with a group-based mediator.
Goldfeder et al. [260] propose a few escrow protocols from
both categories, which we briefly review.
Single Mediator. Several proposed protocols contain a single
mediator and involve 2-of-3 multi-signatures for splitting
the control, threshold-based signatures for improving privacy,
and protocols leveraging homomorphic properties of elliptic
cryptography to achieve privacy (i.e., by blinding the media-
tor’s next address) and non-interactiveness. Another protocol
combines multi-signatures with bonds deposited by a mediator
to avoid DoS by the mediator. Note that blinding of the
mediator’s next address hides the execution of the protocol
to the mediator only in the case when no dispute has arisen.
Group-Based Mediator. In these protocols, disputes are re-
solved by a majority vote. DoS attack is thwarted as long as
the majority of mediators is willing to finish the execution of
the protocol. The privacy of some protocols is preserved by
blinding, similarly as in the case of single mediator protocols.
An example of a distributed marketplace was proposed
in [261], where a marketplace contract lists the products and
an escrow agent contract serves for resolution of disputes by
a mediator (viz. single or group-based mediator). The authors
discuss the integration of logistic parties with verified identities
and reputation systems to assess these parties and mediators.
OpenBazaar48 is a distributed marketplace that uses smart
contract-based escrows with 2-of-3 multi-signatures, where the
mediator is agreed by the buyer and seller. A similar example
is Escaroo49 but in contrast to Openbazaar, it has its own
trusted mediator. Natmin50 is an escrow example that utilizes
a public group of mediators for dispute resolution, while the
reputation of the mediators is adjusted according to their votes
and a result of the dispute.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the escrow category in Figure 27. The first group of threats
refers to a trusted mediator who represents a single-point-
of-failure. The mediator might disrupt the execution of the
48https://openbazaar.org/
49https://escaroo.com/
50https://www.natmin.io/
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category (application layer).
escrow protocol or decide unfairly in the case of a dispute. The
existence of these threats depends on the design of an escrow
protocol. For example, in the Silk Road marketplace [262], a
mediator requests the sending of crypto-tokens to her address,
while she is trusted to send the crypto-tokens to the seller upon
delivery confirmation from the buyer.51 However, the mediator
might refuse to do so and keep the value for herself. The
mitigation techniques are group-based mediators, requiring a
consensus of the majority to decide on a case, or alternatively
requiring the mediator to put a bond into the escrow protocol.
Another mitigation technique is to use reputation systems for
the assessment of a single mediator.
To avoid stealing of the escrowed value by the mediator,
the protocol should by design allow releasing value only
to the buyer or seller (using rules of a smart contract),
while assuming a timeout. For example, an early version of
OpenBazaar utilized smart contracts for trading but without
any timeout. As a result, many buyers did not release the
funds to the seller upon successful delivery. However, when a
timeout is adopted, upon its expiration, a seller can unilaterally
release and acquire the funds from the escrow.
The next class of threats is related to revealing the po-
tentially private information about running the protocol to
public or mediator (e.g., involved parties, occurrences of
disputes). The countermeasures are blinding the mediator’s
address, threshold-based cryptography, including its special
variant encrypt-and-swap [260], which uses a 3-of-3 threshold
signature protocol that assigns one private share to the buyer
and one to the seller, while the third share is known to
both parties. Both parties reveal their private share to the
mediator, who, upon dispute, provides the winning party with
the missing share.
Another possible threat is the double-spending of an un-
confirmed escrowed payment transaction by the buyer. For
example, if a (naive) escrow protocol requires a mediator to
escrow a signed transaction by the buyer and release it to the
blockchain only upon delivery confirmation, the buyer might
not confirm delivery and perform a double-spending attack
51Note that instead of a single mediator, the Silk Road marketplace
utilized several temporary intermediaries with the intention of increasing the
anonymity of the buyer and seller.
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(see Section VI). As a prevention technique, unconfirmed
transactions should not be accepted by the sellers at all.
Moreover, we highlight that some escrow protocols (similarly
as atomic swaps) are sensitive to double-spending performed
by the selfish mining or 51% attacks – therefore, in these pro-
tocols, it is important to wait for enough confirmations or use
consensus protocols having a fast finality (see Section VI-A).
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermeasures:
Although group-based mediators are more robust to attacks
misusing a trust in a single mediator, on the other hand, they
are more expensive to run, requiring the interaction of enough
mediators with the blockchain. This in turn slows down the
throughput of the escrow protocol. The extra operational
overheads are also imposed by the reputation systems for
single mediators. Although encoding the escrow logic into
a smart contract is supported in some implementations (e.g.,
OpenBazaar, Escaroo), they require the deployment of a new
smart contract per each trade, which is a costly option. Such
logic can be implemented even within a single smart con-
tract. Similar to the direct trading, not accepting unconfirmed
transactions implies a long waiting time for the buyer; this is
not the case for the consensus protocols with a fast finality.
Finally, using reputation systems (and their dependencies)
brings their security threats and possible countermeasures with
their limitations.
G. Auctions
In auctions, sellers promote the sale of their goods through
blockchain while buyers place bids for them. Galal and
Youssef [263] specify several desired properties of auctions:
Privacy of bids ensures that values of particular bids are not
revealed to anybody before committing to them.
Posterior privacy ensures that all bids remain private after
the auction ends.
Publicly verifiable correctness enables anybody to verify
the results of the auction through the blockchain.
Resistance against DoS ensures that no bidder or auctioneer
can prematurely abort a protocol without being penalized.
The authors of [263] instantiate the auction as a smart contract,
to which, bidders submit homomorphic commitments of their
sealed bids and then reveal their commitments to the auction-
eer via a PK encryption. Afterward, the auctioneer deciphers
the bids, determines the winner, and announces it to the public
while providing zero-knowledge proofs of the correctness.
As part of their other contribution [264], the same authors
improved on high costs intrinsic to their former work [263]
by using zk-SNARKs and its off-chain computation, which
requires only a single on-chain proof verification of the whole
auction process. However, in both approaches [264], [263], the
auctioneer might compromise the privacy of all bids, which led
the same authors to propose Trustee [265], an approach based
on TEE. In Trustee, the bidders submit encrypted bids to the
auctioneer’s TEE, which confidentially evaluates a winner and
generates a blockchain transaction proving it.
Strain [266] is an auction protocol that guarantees the
privacy of bids against malicious bidders and, in contrast
to [263], [264] also against the auctioneer. Strain is executed in
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Figure 28: Vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses of the auctions
category (application layer).
four rounds (i.e., four blocks), and it assumes a semi-honest
(i.e., passive) auctioneer who acts as a judge verifying the
correctness of zero-knowledge proofs. In Strain, neither the
auctioneer nor a malicious bidder learns anything about bids
of honest bidders; however, the order of the bids is leaked
to the public. Strain requires each bidder to commit publicly
to her bid, while the proposed scheme enables a majority of
honest bidders to open other bidders’ commitments in the case
that they abort the protocol. For the sake of efficiency (i.e.,
a constant number of rounds), the authors provide weaker
security properties in contrast to MPC protocols, where no
semi-honest judge is required. Finally, the authors propose an
extension of their scheme to support the anonymity of all bid-
ders by blinding RSA signatures and Dining Cryptographers
(DC) network.
Another approach that preserves the privacy of the bid
values (but not the privacy of their order) is proposed in [267].
The protocol requires off-chain interaction for two-party com-
putation protocol that performs a pairwise comparison of
blinded bids among bidders and the auctioneer.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: We present a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses related to
the auctions category in Figure 28. There are several possible
issues related to privacy leakage in the auction protocols. The
first privacy issue stands for revealing addresses of bidders
and/or order of their bids to the public. For example, the
authors of [263] do not provide anonymity of bidders, since
bidders use their existing Ethereum addresses to interact with
the protocol. A mitigation technique using blinding RSA sig-
natures and the DC network was proposed in [266]; however,
network-level attacks on revealing locations/IP addresses of
parties remain possible (see Section V).
Since the auctioneer of some protocols (e.g., [263], [264])
sees the bidders and their bids in plain-text, she might either
intentionally or accidentally (e.g., an external compromise)
leak these data (and their corresponding proofs) that are
attributable to particular bidders. The protection technique is to
avoid the auctioneer from seeing the plain-text of the bids, and
instead use privacy-preserving integer comparison (e.g., [266])
or trusted computing-based solutions (e.g., [265]).
Another threat originates from a centralized auctioneer who
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might censor some bidders (e.g., due to collusion with another
bidder) by claiming that their bids are invalid, i.e., claiming
that a commitment does not open to the sealed bid. To cope
with this threat, the auction can utilize a smart contract-
based resolution mechanism in which the bidder might prove
the opposite by revealing her value of the bid, causing a
penalization of the auctioneer [263]. Deposit-based bonds and
penalization of the involved parties can be used as a protection
against abortion of the protocol (i.e., DoS) by any party.
For example, the protocol of [263] splits penalties to honest
participants in the case of abortion by some party. Another
option to cope with the abortion of the auction protocol is
to use multiparty computation (MPC) for the commitment of
sealed bids [266], which enables opening of the commitment
of the aborting party and continue in the auction protocol.
2) Side Effects and Implications of Countermeasures:
Although censoring of bids can be prevented by a smart
contract-based resolution mechanism [263], it has privacy
consequences since it leaks the value of the bid and its
corresponding bidder. Deposit-based bonds can disincentivize
the abortion of the auction protocol but they require a restart
of the round. In contrast to it, MPC protocols for commitments
can recover the current auction round, but with additional
overheads and costs imposed on a smart contract platform.
In the case of using a TEE-based solution, the malicious
auctioneer might perform censorship of some bidders due
to collusion with some bidder. To avoid this threat, the
authors of [265] propose a smart contract-based mechanism
that verifies whether the set of submitted sealed bids to smart
contract correspond to the list of bids in the proof generated
by TEE. Authors also discuss another option to cope with this
attack by embedding an SPV client within the TEE that would
evaluate the state of the blockchain; however, this solution
would impose a memory consumption of already constrained
TEE and would expose TEE to vulnerabilities presented in
SPV client. Another implication of using TEE-based auction
is the possibility of a local replay attack discussed in [265],
where the auctioneer might provide different instances of TEE
with a different subset of the bids, and hence obtain the
values of particular bids. As described in [265], such a privacy
threat can be prevented by a TEE specific construct called
hardware monotonic counter, which cannot be reverted once
incremented. Finally, one has to consider that a vulnerability
in trusted hardware (caused by a manufacturer or its infras-
tructure) may result in the unfairness of the auction process
and compromising of privacy.
H. General Applications of Blockchains
There are many use cases of applying blockchain to a
particular domain that contains mutually untrusted partici-
pants: these participants are represented by consensus nodes
executing a consensus protocol. Applications from this cat-
egory focus on leveraging inherent features provided by the
blockchains and sometimes even on non-inherent features (see
Appendix A).
An example that uses permissioned blockchain for the man-
agement of healthcare data is proposed in [268], where new
data are included in the blockchain upon majority agreement.
The consensus nodes of this approach are represented by
a patient, her family, and healthcare providers. The authors
discuss an issue regarding the right to delete the personal data,
which is contrary to the inherent features of the blockchain. A
data protection framework for energy grids and power systems
was proposed in [269]. The authors suggest that smart meters
act as consensus nodes and store the data of the blockchain
in their memory.52 DistBlockNet [270] is the approach for
ensuring a state consistency among multiple SDN controllers
with the utilization of dedicated blockchain. In detail, flow rule
tables of SDN controllers are managed by these controllers,
while other entities in the system use blockchain as a reference
point for downloading these tables. A federated permissioned
blockchain used as a cloud-based data storage requiring the
consensus of all nodes53 is proposed in work [271]. The au-
thors propose to use two tiers of blockchain. The blockchain at
the first tier is private and serves for consensus of participants,
while the blockchain of the second tier is public PoW (e.g.,
Bitcoin) and serves for periodic publishing of integrity state of
the first tier blockchain. Two-tier blockchain was also applied
in the domain of IoT [272]. The authors of [272] deem the
first tier blockchain as local to a group of IoT devices owned
by a single party, while the second tier blockchain serves for
sharing the data among multiple untrusted parties. The authors
demonstrate the applicability in a case study involving several
smart homes.
1) Security Threats and Mitigations: Security threats
of this general category vary case by case and usually concern
the privacy of data shared among involved parties [268],
[269], [272]. Another common issue is an application of
the blockchain with unrealistic assumptions about the target
environment, e.g., low processing and storage performance
of smart meters/IoT devices, missing HW support for asym-
metric cryptography, tamper-proof assumptions about devices
producing transactions, etc. Some applications try to optimize
throughput or finality of the blockchain by introducing their
own consensus mechanisms (e.g., [272], [271]); however, this
might not be the best option since new attack vectors might be
created. A general recommendation is to study and understand
security issues and countermeasures of the state-of-the-art
approaches of the consensus layer (see Section VI) as well as
privacy concerns presented at the RSM layer (see Section VII).
X. LESSONS LEARNED
In this section, we summarize lessons learned concerning
the security reference architecture (SRA) and its practical
utilization. First, we describe the hierarchy of security depen-
dencies among particular layers of the SRA. Second, assuming
such a hierarchy, we describe a security-oriented methodology
for designers of blockchain platforms and applications. Next,
we summarize the design goals of particular blockchain types
and discuss the security-specific features of the blockchains.
Finally, we analyze observations from the incidents that oc-
52These are unrealistic assumptions.
53Note that such a proposal has very low fault tolerance.
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curred in practice, limitations in the literature, and we propose
future research directions.
A. Hierarchy of Dependencies in the SRA
In the proposed model of the SRA, we observe that con-
sequences of vulnerabilities presented at lower layers of the
SRA are manifested in the same layers and/or at higher layers,
especially at the application layer. Therefore, we refer to
security dependencies of these layers on lower layers or the
same layers, i.e., reflexive and bottom-up dependencies. We
describe these two types of dependencies in the following.
Reflexive Dependencies. If a layer of the SRA contains some
assets, it also contains a reflexive security dependency on the
countermeasures presented in the same layer. It means that
a countermeasure at a particular layer protects the assets pre-
sented in the same layer. For example, in the case of consensus
layer whose protocols reward consensus nodes for the par-
ticipation, the countermeasures against selfish mining attacks
protect rewards (i.e., crypto-tokens) of consensus nodes. In the
case of the RSM layer, the privacy of user identities and data
is protected by various countermeasures of this layer (e.g.,
blinding signatures, secure multiparty computations). Another
group of reflexive security dependencies is presented at the
application layer. Although the application layer contains some
bottom-up security dependencies (see Figure 15), we argue
that with regard to the overall stacked model of the SRA
they can be viewed as reflexive security dependencies of the
application layer.
Bottom-Up Dependencies. If a layer of the SRA contains
some assets, beside reflexive security dependencies, it also
contains bottom-up security dependencies on the counter-
measures of all lower layers. Hence, the consequences of
vulnerabilities presented at lower layers of SRA might be
manifested at the same layers (i.e., reflexive dependencies)
but more importantly, they are manifested at higher layers,
especially at the application layer. For example, context-
sensitive transactions and partial solutions as countermeasures
of the consensus layer can protect against front-running at-
tacks of intra-chain DEXes, which occur at the application
layer. Another example represents programming bugs in the
RSM layer, which influence the correct functionality at the
application layer. The eclipse attack is an example that im-
pacts the consensus layer from the network layer – a victim
consensus node operates over the attacker-controlled chain,
and thus causes a loss of crypto-tokens by a consensus node
and at the same time it decreases honest consensus power
of the network. In turn, this might simplify selfish-mining
attacks at the consensus layer, which in turn might impact the
correct functionality of a blockchain-based application at the
application layer. Bottom-up security dependencies are also
presented in the context of the application layer, as we have
already mentioned in Section VIII.
B. Methodology for Designers
A hierarchy of security dependencies in the SRA can be
utilized during the design of new blockchain-based solu-
tions. When designing a new blockchain platform or a new
blockchain application, we recommend designers to specify
requirements on the blockchain features (see Appendix A) and
afterward analyze design options and their attack surfaces at
the first three layers of the stacked model of SRA. We briefly
summarize the pros and cons of particular categories within
the first three layers of SRA in Table I, while security threats
and mitigations are covered in Section V, Section VI, and
Section VII.
On top of that, we recommend the designers of a new
blockchain application to analyze particular options and their
security implications at the application layer of SRA. We list
the pros and cons of a few categories from the application
layer in Table II,54 while security threats and mitigation
techniques of this layer are elaborated in Section VIII and
Section IX. During this process, we recommend the designers
to follow security dependencies of the target category on other
underlying categories (see Figure 15) if their decentralized
variants are used (which is a preferable option from the
security point-of-view). For example, if one intends to design
a decentralized reputation system, she is advised to study
the security threats from the reputation system category and
its recursive dependencies on e-voting, identity management,
(optionally) filesystems, and crypto-tokens & wallets.
Divide and Conquer. If a designer of the blockchain ap-
plication is also designing her own blockchain platform, we
recommend her to split the functionality of the solution with
the divide-and-conquer approach respecting particular layers
of our stacked model. In detail, if some functionality is specific
to the application layer, then it should be implemented at
that layer. Such an approach minimizes the attack surface
of a solution and enables isolating the threats to specific
layers, where they are easier to protect from and reviewed
by the community. A contra-example is to incorporate a part
of application layer functionality/validation into the consensus
layer. The consensus layer should deal only with the ordering
of transactions, and it should be agnostic to the application.
Nevertheless, it worth noting that the divide-and-conquer
approach might not be suitable for some very specific
cases. For example, some decentralized filesystems (see Sec-
tion VIII-D) might combine data storage as an application-
layer service with the proof-of-storage consensus algorithm,
presented at the consensus layer. Therefore, the consensus
layer also embeds a part of functionality from the application
layer. However, when filesystems are in security dependencies
of the target application other than filesystems, one should
realize that they are usually running on a different blockchain
or infrastructure than the target application, and this exception
is not a concern.
C. Blockchain Types & Design Goals
We learned that the type of a blockchain (see Section III-B)
implies the specific design goals of its consensus protocol (see
Figure 29), which must be considered on top of the standard
design goals (i.e., liveness and safety) and the inherent features
54Note that the table contains only categories with specified sub-
categorizations that represent the subject to a comparison.
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Layer Categoryin a Layer Pros Cons
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Networks
• low latency, high throughput
• centralized administration, ease of access control
• the privacy of data and identities
• meeting regulatory obligations
• resilience to external attacks
• VPN is required for geographically spread
participants
• suitable only for permissioned blockchains
• insider threat and external attacks at nodes with
administrative privileges
Public
Networks
• high decentralization
• high availability
• openness & low entry barrier (low cost of
broadband connection, resistance to regulations)
• high and non-uniform latency
• single-point-of-failure (DNS, IP, and ASes
are managed by centralized parties)
• external adversaries (botnets, compromised
BGP/DNS servers)
• stolen identities
C
on
se
ns
us
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ay
er
PoR • high cost of overriding the history of blockchain• high scalability
• high operational costs
• low throughput
• low finality
BFT • high throughput (with a small number of nodes)• fast finality
• low scalability
• high communication complexity
• limited number of nodes (efficient use only
in permissioned blockchains)
PoS • energy efficiency
• PoS specific attacks and issues
• supports only semi-permissionless setting
• slow finality
PoS+BFT
• energy efficiency
• high scalability
• probabilistic security guarantees
• lower communication overheads than BFT
• some PoS specific attacks
• supports only semi-permissionless setting
PoR+BFT • high scalability• fast finality • spending some scarce resources
PoR+PoS
(i.e., PoA) • high scalability
• spending some scarce resources
• some PoS specific attacks
• slow finality
R
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Standard Approach • fast processing• ease of verification
• identities are only pseoudonymous and can
be traced to IPs
• all data of transactions are publicly visible
Standard Approach
+ Mixers
• privacy identity protection of users in a group
• ease of verification
• additional complexity, in some cases unlinkability
by the mixer or involved parties in a group
• all data of transactions are publicly visible
NIZKs and
Ring-Signatures
• identities are anonymized to the extend of
the group
• additional computation overheads for running
the schemes
MPC
Blinding Signatures,
Layered-Encryption
• unlinkability for all involved parties • additional computation overheads for runningthe schemes
Pr
ot
ec
tin
g
D
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a
NIZKs, Blinding
Signatures, Homomor-
phic Encryption
• privacy of data in cryptocurrency
platforms
• additional computation overheads for running
the schemes
Trusted Transaction
Managers,
Trusted Hardware,
MPC
• privacy of data in transactions of smart contract
platforms
• additional computation overheads for running
the schemes
Sm
ar
t
C
on
tr
ac
ts Turing-CompleteLanguages
• smart contracts may contain an arbitrary
programming logic
• wide surface for making the programming bugs
that often results in vulnerabilities
Turing-Incomplete
Languages • small attack surface and emphasis on safety
• the programming logic serves only for limited
purposes
Table I: Pros and cons of various categories within the first three layers of the stacked model.
Design
Goals
Standard
Liveness
Safety
Specific
Permissionless
Permissioned &
Semi-Permissionless
Elimination of Sybil
Entities
Fresh & Fair Leader /
Committee Election
Non-Interactive Verifi-
cation of the Result
Figure 29: Standard and specific design goals of consensus protocols.
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Application
Category Subcategory Pros Cons
W
al
le
ts
Server-Side
Hosted
Wallets
• simplicity of control for end-users
• no storage requirements for end-users
• keys stored at the server, susceptibility to the theft of keys by external
or internal attacks
• single-point-of-failure, availability attacks
Client-Side
Hosted
Wallets
• simplicity of control for end-users
• no storage requirements for end-users
• keys stored locally
• single-point-of-failure, availability attacks
• possibility of key theft by malware
• possibility of tampering attacks
Self-Sovereign
Wallets
• keys stored locally
or in a dedicated hardware device
• moderate storage requirements for end-users
• more difficult control for end-users
• extra device to carry in the case of hardware wallet
E
xc
ha
ng
es
Centralized
Exchange
• a high throughput and speed of operations
• the simplicity of control for end-users
• low costs for exchange transactions
• trading of obscure crypto-tokens
• risk of insider threat due to centralization
• external threats to exchange infrastructure
• overheads for secure storage of secrets
• a fee specified by the operator
Direct
Cross-Chain
Exchange
• fairness of the exchange
• no fee to any operator
• costs for 4 transactions of the atomic swap
• user has to find the counter-order on her own
• counter-orders might not exist
• a lower throughput than in a centralized exchange
• a higher complexity for end-users
Cross-Chain
DEX
• fairness of the exchange
• order matching made by DEX
• trading of obscure crypto-tokens
• costs for 4 or 6 transactions of the atomic swap
• a lower throughput than in a centralized exchange
• a fee specified by the operator
Intra-Chain
DEX
• fairness of the exchange
• uniform finality for every pair
• a high speed of operations
• a limited number of pairs that are specific to the target platform
• a fee specified by the operator
• costs for smart contract execution
O
ra
cl
es
Prediction
Markets
• early (close to accurate) estimation
of the future event’s result
• decentralization
• possible conflict of interest
• a limited set of data specific to a few events
• a long time to obtain a final result, especially in
the case of disputes
Centralized
Data Feeds
• wide range of data
• fast provisioning time
• handling of private parameters of requests
• censorship evidence
• centralization (accidentally or intentionally wrong data)
• availability issues
Oracle
Networks
• decentralization
• wide range of data
• fast provisioning time
• unsupported private parameters of requests
• publicly visible data and requests
Fi
le
sy
st
em
s
Fully
Replicated FSs
with Ledger
• a high availability
• accountability and auditability
• a high storage overheads and operational costs
• a high price
Partially
Replicated FSs
with Ledger
• reasonably high availability
• accountability and auditability
• a lower price than in a full replication
• attack vectors specific to partial replication
Partially
Replicated FSs
without Ledger
• reasonably high availability
• a lower price than in a full replication
• a lack of native accountability and auditability
• low durability due to a lack of incentives for storage
Centralized
Storage of
Off-Chain Data
• a low price
• accountability and auditability • a low availability
Table II: Pros and cons of some categories from the application layer.
(see Appendix A1) during the design of a particular blockchain
platform and its consensus protocol. In the following, we
elaborate on such specific design goals.
Permissionless Type. The first design goal is to eliminate
Sybil entities – such elimination can be done by requiring that
some amount of scarce resources is spent for extension of the
blockchain, and hence no Sybil entity can participate. This
implies that no pure PoS protocol can be permissionless since
it never spends resources on running a consensus protocol. The
next design goal is a fresh and fair leader/committee election,
which ensures that each consensus node influences the result of
a consensus commensurately to the number of scarce resources
spent. Moreover, freshness avoids the prediction of the elected
nodes, and therefore elected nodes cannot become the subject
of targeted DoS attacks. The last design goal is the non-
interactive verification of the consensus result by any node
– i.e., any node can verify the result of the consensus based
on the data present in the blockchain.
Permissioned and Semi-Permissionless Types. These types
of blockchains require fresh and fair leader/committee elec-
tion as well as non-interactive verification of the result of
the consensus. However, in contrast to the permissionless
blockchains, they do not require a means for the elimination
of Sybil entities, as permission to enter the system is given by
36
a centralized entity (i.e., permissioned type) or any existing
consensus node (i.e., semi-permissionless type).
Blockchain Types and Incentives. We observed that no
application running on a public (permissioned) blockchain has
been able to work without introducing crypto-tokens (i.e., an
incentive scheme), even if the use case is not financial in
nature, e.g., e-voting, notaries, secure timestamping, or repu-
tation systems. In these blockchains, incentive schemes serve
as a means for the elimination of Sybil entities, besides other
purposes. The situation is different in the context of private
(permissioned) blockchains, which are usually provisioned by
a single organization or a consortium and do not necessarily
need their crypto-tokens to operate. Misaligned incentives can
cause consensus-level vulnerabilities, e.g., when it becomes
profitable to drop blocks of other nodes in order to earn higher
mining rewards [80] or transaction fees [273]. The design of
incentive mechanisms is a research field by itself and we refer
the reader to the work of Leonardos et al. [274].
D. Security-Specific Features of Blockchains
We realized that consensus protocols are the target of most
financially-oriented attacks on the decentralized infrastructure
of blockchains, even if such attacks might originate from the
network layer (e.g., routing and eclipse attacks). The goal
of these attacks is to overturn and re-order already ordered
blocks while doing double-spending. Hence, the finality is
the most security-critical feature of the consensus layer. The
finality differs per various categories of the consensus layer.
The best finality is achieved in the pure BFT protocols, and
the worse finality is achieved in the single-leader-based PoR
and PoS protocols. On the other hand, combinations of the
BFT with PoS protocols (i.e., introducing committees) slightly
deteriorate the finality of BFT in a probabilistic ratio that is
commensurate to the committee size. In the case of PoR pro-
tocols with partial solutions, finality is improved as opposed to
pure PoR protocols; however, it is also probabilistic, depending
on the number of partial solutions.
E. Incidents in Practice
We list several incidents at each layer of the SRA in
Table III, Table IV, Table V, and Table VI of Appendix. The
observations about the number of different incident types vary
layer by layer. In the case of the network layer, many of the
described attacks occurred or were demonstrated as proof-of-
concepts. However, incidents that occurred at the consensus
layer mostly contained 51% attacks with double-spending,
while incidents that occurred on the application layer were
mostly caused by the exploitation of centralized components.
In the case of the RSM layer, most of the incidents occurred
due to bugs in smart contracts. Finally, we observed that most
of the incidents that occurred at the application layer (see
Table VI) were caused due to a single-point-of-failure, e.g.,
centralized components or the insider threat.
Although the number of occurred incident types is low as
compared to described vulnerabilities and threats, we argue
that the adoption of blockchains for practical applications is
still in its infancy, and thus we may expect that the number
of different incident types observed in practice will grow.
F. Limitations in the Literature and Practice
Applications of Blockchains. Although the literature contains
surveys and overviews [11], [12], [275] of blockchain-based
applications, these works introduce only domain-oriented cat-
egorizations (i.e., categories such financial, governance, se-
curity, education, supply chain, etc.) and they do not in-
vestigate the security aspects and functionalities that these
applications leverage on and whether some of the applications
do not belong to the same category from the security and
functionality point-of-view. To address this limitation, we
provide a security-driven functionality-oriented categorization
of blockchain-based applications (see Section VIII), which is
agnostic to an application domain and thus can generalize
different application scenarios. Furthermore, our proposed
categorization enables to model security and functionality-
based dependencies among particular categories, which is not
possible with state-of-the-art categorizations.
Centralization. Even though blockchains are meant to be
fully decentralized, we have seen that this does not hold
at some layers of the SRA – the network and application
layers. In the network layer, some attacks are possible due
to centralized DNS bootstrapping, while in the application
layer a few categories utilize centralized components to ensure
some functionality that cannot run on-chain or its provisioning
would be too expensive and slow, which, however, forms the
trade-off with the security. Some applications might depend on
components from other application categories (e.g., identity
management) but implementing these components in a cen-
tralized fashion even though there exist some decentralized
variants that are gaining popularity (e.g., DIDs [214] for
identity management).
G. Future Research Directions
Fast Finality. Although finality is the most security-critical
feature of the consensus layer (see Section X-D), it forms the
trade-off with the scalability. Therefore, we believe that the
future focus of the consensus research should be in a thorough
evaluation of this trade-off across various consensus protocols.
Network-Layer Security. We learned that a substantial body
of the security research in blockchains is focusing on the
consensus and RSM layers since these layers are mostly
identified with the blockchains. As opposed to them (see
Figure 1), the network layer is not so popular even though the
serious threats originating from this layer might hurt the higher
layers and their assets. Therefore, a potential direction for
future research lies in studying the security aspects of network
protocols, their suitability for a decentralized environment, and
potential improvements.
Privacy Preservation & Performance. All cryptographic
privacy preservation techniques (see Section VII-A1) bring
additional computation overhead, and thus they negatively
impact the throughput of the blockchains. On the other hand,
privacy-preserving solutions that are based on the trusted
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hardware might provide higher performance, but they rely
on the manufacturer of trusted hardware and the assumption
that it will not be compromised. Therefore, we believe that
optimizing the trade-off between performance and privacy-
preservation is an important future research direction concern-
ing the RSM layer.
Security Analysis of the Application Layer. Although many
references included in this study are presented in the appli-
cation layer, only a very few of them analyze thoroughly
security aspects of a particular application layer category or
its instance. Therefore, as a future research direction, we
recommend the authors of the blockchain-based applications
to analyze the resistance of their applications to all known
threats of a particular application category (e.g., with help
of our work), while broadly think of new vulnerabilities and
threats that might be specific to their application.
Decentralization. Since some blockchain applications utilize
centralized components while their decentralized variants al-
ready exist Section X-F, we suggest that a potential future
direction for researchers and practitioners might be the con-
cept of a fully decentralized blockchain ecosystem. Such an
ecosystem might consist of only decentralized (or partially
decentralized) application types, for example, the ones that
we reviewed in the application layer of the SRA.
XI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first discuss the versatility and modularity
of the stacked model that is the proposed security reference
architecture (SRA) based on. Then, we outline a few additional
security aspects related to blockchains, which, for clarity and
simplicity, we have not pursued throughout this paper or
mentioned them only tangentially. Finally, we discuss a few
types of blockchain-oriented applications that directly inherit
security aspects from already existing categories; therefore, we
omitted such application types in our work.
A. Stacked Model
Versatility. The hierarchical stacked model that is the SRA
based on was already utilized in other domains before. A
well-known example is the ISO/OSI model with 7 layers
or later derived TCP/IP model with 4 layers in the field
of communication networks. The stacked model was also
applied in cloud computing, referred to as cloud stack [276], in
which, each layer represents one service model in the model’s
hierarchy. Nevertheless, the stacked model was also applied in
the field of blockchains [16].
The versatility of the stack model allows not only for
modeling the hierarchy in a particular domain but also for
partitioning the corresponding security issues and their coun-
termeasures based on the layers of the model. This was done
for the ISO/OSI model [277], TCP/IP model [278], and cloud
computing [8], while in this work we focus on the security
threats related to blockchains and propose the SRA.
Modularity. The stack model of SRA also enables extensions
of particular categories within each layer by adding new
vulnerabilities, threats, and their respective countermeasures.
Likewise, the new categories can be modularly added to each
of the SRA layers. Afterward, the security implications of a
new category, threat, or a countermeasure within some layer
should be studied with regard to particular categories in higher
layers – a new category might be beneficial or detrimental
to them from a security point of view. When introducing a
new defense or mitigation technique, it is also important to
evaluate its side effects and implications on the features of the
blockchain that are manifested at the same and higher layers.
A general guideline for extending the SRA is to introduce
only such categories that have unique features from the secu-
rity point-of-view, while in the case of the application layer,
functionality point-of-view should be considered as well.
B. Additional Security Aspects
Secure Cryptography Primitives. We emphasize that for
each layer of our stacked model, we assume the use of secure
cryptographic primitives with recommended key lengths55 that
are based on existing standards (e.g., [279], [280]). Examples
include secure communication (i.e., network layer), the use
of private keys for transaction signing (i.e., consensus layer),
and password management for blockchain-based services (i.e.,
application layer). Since the area of cryptographic primitives
is standardized and extensively covered in existing research,
we treat security incidents that break these primitives as out-
of-scope in the current paper.
Semantic Bugs. We deal with semantic bugs only at the
level of the RSM layer as part of the smart contract code
(see Section VII-B). However, we emphasize that semantic
bugs in the blockchain infrastructure may occur at each of the
proposed layers, whereas in the case of the RSM layer, besides
smart contracts, they may occur in compilers, interpreters, etc.
In this work, we assume that the software of the blockchain-
related infrastructure does not contain any programming se-
mantic bugs at each of the layers, and it provides the expected
functionality. On the other hand, we emphasize that these
semantic bugs had already accounted for several incidents in
the past, e.g., [281], [282], [283], [284]. To achieve safe and
correct software at each of the layers, similar to the case of the
RSM layer, developers and designers should utilize verification
tools, testing, code reviews, audits, known design patterns, best
practices, etc.
C. Other Blockchain-Oriented Applications
There are several other applications of blockchain that we
do not mention in our work because their security aspects
are inherited from one or more categories presented in Sec-
tion VIII and Section IX. For example, insurance applications
running on smart contract platforms inherit security aspects
from the oracles category, as they require data to be delivered
into the blockchain from the outside world. The next example
is the trading of crypto-tokens within the same blockchain
platform – it inherits security aspects from the crypto-tokens
and wallets category (see Section VIII-A). Another example
is the cross-chain communication, which is a generalization
55https://www.keylength.com
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of the exchanges category, and it also inherits most of the
security aspects from it.
XII. RELATED WORK
The security reference architecture that has been presented
in our work offers a comprehensive overview of blockchain-
related security vulnerabilities, threats, and mitigation tech-
niques. We adapted a custom version of the four-layer stacked
model, initially presented in the work of Wang et al. [16].
In the following, we present an overview of the state-of-the-
art survey papers related to blockchain research while we
highlight the differences in contrast to our work. We consider
three groups of blockchain-oriented research: (1) papers that
use a flat categorization of threats and vulnerabilities, (2)
papers that use a stacked or other multi-layered models, and
(3) papers that focus on incidents that belong to a single layer.
Research with Flat Categorization. Bonneau et al. [176]
present the first major survey of blockchain-specific security
aspects, with a particular focus on Bitcoin and cryptocur-
rencies. The authors aim at the consensus-layer properties,
although some network-layer aspects (e.g., DoS attacks) are
discussed as well. Since smart contract functionality was in its
early stages of development at that time, not much is said about
RSM-layer properties, and little is said about applications be-
yond cryptocurrencies and data storage. Similarly, Tschorsch
et al. [285] and Yli-Huumo et al. [286] present early survey
papers that focus mostly on consensus- and network-layer
attacks, but they also deal with user privacy. The latter [286]
has a particular focus on the publication details of blockchain
research until 2016, e.g., the venues and the countries of
the authors’ institutions. Li et al. [287] present a high-level
overview of blockchain security threats and incidents, but the
categorization is lacking. The authors deal with selfish mining,
the DAO hack, BGP hijacking, and eclipse attacks, while
all of them are mentioned as individual incidents. Conti et
al. [288] present an overview of consensus- and network-layer
attacks inherent to the Bitcoin blockchain. One interesting
contribution is its overview of client-side attacks and attacks
on exchange systems. Many attacks presented in this work
are supported by evidence of incidents. On the other hand,
the authors spent only a little effort on the issues related to
the RSM and application layers.
Research with Layered or Stacked Categorization. Wang
et al. [16] are the first to propose a 4-layer model denoted
as “a network implementation stack.” Despite proposing the
stacked model, the authors do not focus on attacks and
countermeasures concerning each of the layers. The main
focus of their work is on the consensus layer, where the
authors dedicate most of their attention to PoR, PoS, and BFT
protocols as well as improving blockchain performance by
sharding, side-chains, and non-linear data organization. In the
application layer, the authors discuss a few types of emerging
blockchain-based applications, such as general-purpose data
storage and access control. Saad et al. [289] identify three
categories of attacks: blockchain structure attacks, peer-to-peer
system attacks, and application-oriented attacks. As compared
to our work, it mostly holds that their peer-to-peer system
attacks encompass our network and consensus layer attacks,
whereas their application-oriented attacks include the RSM
and application-layer attacks from our work. In contrast to
our work, Saad et al. [289] put double-spending attacks into
application-oriented attacks, whereas in our case, they are part
of the consensus layer since the means for their realization
resides in this layer. Moreover, the authors of this paper deal
with cryptojacking attacks, which are out-of-the-scope for our
reference architecture, as they are not related to the infrastruc-
ture of the involved parties we consider (see Section III-A).
Chen et al. [290] propose a 4-layer model similar to ours,
which is used to study vulnerabilities in Ethereum. The authors
identify 44 vulnerabilities, 26 attacks, and 47 defenses in
total. In contrast to our model, the authors use the “data”
layer in place of our RSM layer. This leads to a difference
in interpretation between their framework and ours: e.g., they
consider re-entrancy bugs as an application layer vulnerability,
whereas we treat them as an RSM-layer vulnerability. Since
the authors focus on Ethereum, most vulnerabilities belong
to the RSM layer; however, some of the other vulnerabilities
(e.g., the BGP hijacking attack against MyEtherWallet [291],
[292]) do not seem to be specific for Ethereum. In contrast,
our work takes a broader view, and we do not constrain
it to a single blockchain. Another stack-based model was
proposed by Zhang et al. [293] and consists of six layers,
where the layers stand for the application, contract, incentive,
consensus, network, and a data layer. The works of Alkhalifah
et al. [294] and Zhu et al. [295] feature groupings consisting
of five (network, consensus, mining pool, smart contract, and
client vulnerabilities) and four (data privacy, data availability,
data integrity, and data controllability attacks) categories,
respectively. Natoli et al. [296] focus mainly on the consensus
layer but include some network-layer attacks as well (e.g.,
eclipse attacks and BGP hijacking).
Research Focusing on a Particular Layer. Finally, there is
a number of survey papers that explicitly focus on specific
layers: the network layer is analyzed in [297], the RSM layer
(in particular smart contracts [137], [298], [299]), protocols
of the consensus layer [99], [112], [300], [274], [301], [302],
incentives at the consensus layer [303], [304], and application
layer from the general standpoint [11] or with a focus on the
IoT domain [305], [306], [307], [308].
XIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focused on the systematization of the
knowledge about security aspects of blockchain systems,
while we aimed to create a standardized model for studying
vulnerabilities and security threats. We proposed a stack-
modeled security reference architecture consisting of four
layers, and at each of the layers, we surveyed categories and
options for their instantiation with their respective security
implications and properties. We modeled particular categories
as vulnerability/threat/defense graphs, which we provided as a
means for reasoning about imposed security aspects. Finally,
we collected a sample of blockchain-related incidents that
occurred in practice, which we further categorized using our
proposed model. We observed that the number of incident
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types occurred in practice is substantially smaller than the
number of described threats, especially in the consensus and
application layer. In the case of the application layer, most
of the incidents occurred due to exploiting a centralized
component by external or internal attackers, while in the case
of the consensus layer, most of the incidents occurred due to
temporary violation of protocol assumptions by 51% attacks.
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APPENDIX
A. Features of Blockchains
Blockchains were initially introduced as a means of cop-
ing with the centralization of monetary assets management,
resulting in their most popular application – a decentral-
ized cryptocurrency with native crypto-tokens. However, other
blockchain applications have meanwhile started to proliferate
as well, benefiting from features other than decentralization.
We summarize the inherent and non-inherent features of
blockchains in the following.
1) Inherent Features:
Decentralization: is achieved by a distributed consensus pro-
tocol – the protocol ensures that each modification of the
ledger is a result of interaction among participants. In the
consensus protocol, participants are equal, i.e., no single
entity is designed as an authority. An important result of
decentralization is resilience to node failures.
Censorship Resistance: is achieved due to decentralization,
and it ensures that each valid transaction is processed and
included in the blockchain.
Immutability: means that the history of the ledger cannot
be easily modified – it requires a significant quorum of
colluding nodes. The immutability of history is achieved
by a cryptographic one-way function (i.e., a hash func-
tion) that creates integrity-preserving links between the
previous record (i.e., block) and the current one. In this
way, integrity-preserving chains (e.g., blockchains) or
graphs (e.g., direct acyclic graphs [22], [309], [310] or
trees [23]) are built in an append-only fashion. However,
the immutability of new blocks is not immediate and de-
pends on the time to the finality of a particular consensus
protocol (see Section III-C).
Availability: although distributed ledgers are highly redun-
dant in terms of data storage (i.e., full nodes store
replicated data), the main advantage of such redundancy
is paid off by extremely high availability of the system.
This feature may be of special interest to applications that
cannot tolerate outages.
Auditability: correctness of each transaction and block
recorded in the blockchain can be validated by any
participating node, which is possible due to the publicly-
known rules of a consensus protocol.
Transparency: the transactions stored in the blockchain as
well as the actions of protocol participants are visible to
other participants and in most cases even to the public.
2) Non-Inherent Features:
Additionally to the inherent features, blockchains may be
equipped with other features that aim to achieve extra goals.
Below we list a few examples of such non-inherent features.
Energy Efficiency: running an open distributed ledger often
means that scarce resources are wasted (e.g., Proof-of-
Work). However, there are available consensus protocols
that do not waste scarce resources, but instead emulate
the consumption of scarce resources (i.e., Proof-of-Burn),
or the interest rate on an investment (i.e., Proof-of-Stake).
See examples of these protocols in Section VI.
Scalability: describes how the consensus protocol scales
when the number of participants increases. Protocols
whose behavior is not negatively affected by an increasing
number of participants have the high scalability.
Throughput: represents the number of transactions that can
be processed per unit of time. Some consensus proto-
cols have only a small throughput (e.g., Proof-of-Work),
while others are designed with the intention to maximize
throughput (e.g., Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) proto-
cols with a small number of participants). See examples
of BFT protocols in Section VI-C.
Privacy & Anonymity: by design, data recorded on a pub-
lic blockchain is visible to all nodes or public, which
may lead to privacy and anonymity issues. Therefore,
multiple solutions increasing the anonymity (e.g., ring
signatures [311] in Monero) and privacy (e.g., zk-
SNARKs [312] in Zcash) were proposed in the context of
cryptocurrencies, while other efforts have been made in
privacy-preserving smart contract platforms [130], [131].
Accountability and Non-Repudiation: if blockchains or ap-
plications running on top of them are designed in such
a way that identities of nodes (or application users) are
known and verified, accountability and non-repudiation
of actions performed can be provided too.
B. Atomic Swap Protocols
Atomic Swap for Two Parties. Atomic swaps assume
two parties A and B owning crypto-tokens in two different
blockchains. A and B wish to execute cross-chain exchange
atomically and thus achieve a fairness property, i.e., either both
of the parties receive the agreed amount of crypto-tokens or
neither of them. First, this process involves an agreement on
the amount and exchange rate, and second, the execution of
the exchange itself.
In a centralized scenario [313], the approach is to utilize
a trusted third party for the execution of the exchange. In
contrast to the centralized scenario, blockchains allow us to
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execute such an exchange without a requirement of the trusted
party. The atomic swap protocol [314] enables conditional
redemption of the funds in the first blockchain to B upon
revealing of the hash pre-image (i.e., secret) that redeems
the funds on the second blockchain to A. The atomic swap
protocol is based on two Hashed Time-Lock Contracts (HTLC)
that are deployed by both parties in both blockchains.
Although HTLCs can be realized by Turing-incomplete
smart contracts with support for hash-locks and time-locks,
for clarity, we provide a description assuming Turing-complete
smart contracts, requiring four transactions:
1) A chooses a random string x (i.e., a secret) and computes
its hash h(x). Using h(x), A deploys HTLCA on the
first blockchain and sends the agreed amount to it, which
later enables anybody to do a conditional transfer of that
amount to B upon calling a particular method of HTLCA
with x = h(x) as an argument (i.e., hash-lock). Moreover,
A defines a time-lock, which, when expired, allows A
to recover funds into her address by calling a dedicated
method: this is to prevent aborting of the protocol by
another party.
2) When B notices that HTLCA has been already deployed,
she deploys HTLCB on the second blockchain and sends
the agreed amount there, enabling a conditional transfer
of that amount to A upon revealing the correct pre-image
of h(x) (h(x) is visible from already deployed HTLCA).
B also defines a time-lock in HTLCB to handle abortion
by A.
3) Once A notices deployed HTLCB, she calls a method
of HTLCB with revealed x, and in turn, she obtains the
funds on the second blockchain.
4) Once B notices that x was revealed by A on the second
blockchain, she calls a method of HTLCA with x as an
argument, and in turn, she obtains the funds on the first
blockchain.
If any of the parties aborts, the counter-party waits until the
time-lock expires and redeems the funds.
Atomic Swap for Three Parties. In the following, we outline
three-way atomic swap protocol, where party A wishes to sell
an asset a for BTC, the party B wishes to buy a for ETH, and
DEX E is inter-mediating the asset transfer:
1) B chooses a random string x (i.e., a secret) and computes
its hash h(x). Using h(x), B deploys HTLCB on the
Ethereum blockchain and sends the agreed ETH amount
there, which later enables anybody to do a conditional
transfer of that amount to E upon calling a particular
method of HTLCB with x = h(x) as an argument.
Moreover, B defines a time-lock to handle abortion by
any party.
2) Once E notices that HTLCB has been already deployed
on the Ethereum blockchain, she deploys HTLCE on the
Bitcoin blockchain and sends the agreed BTC amount
there, enabling a conditional transfer of that amount to
A upon revealing the correct pre-image of h(x) (which
is visible in already deployed HTLCB). E also defines a
time-lock in HTLCE.
3) Once A notices that HTLCA has been already deployed
on the Bitcoin blockchain, she deploys HTLCA on the
asset blockchain and lock the asset a there, enabling a
conditional transfer of a to B upon revealing the correct
pre-image of h(x) (which is visible in already deployed
HTLCB and HTLCE). A also defines a time-lock in
HTLCA.
4) When B notices that both HTLCE and HTLCA have
been already correctly deployed, she reveals the secret x
as a part of the transaction sent to HTLCA. This triggers
a transfer of asset a to B.
5) Once A notices that x was revealed, she sends a transac-
tion with x to HTLCE, obtaining BTC from E.
6) Once E notices that x was revealed, she sends a transac-
tion with x to HTLCB, obtaining ETH from B.
C. Examples of Incidents
In the current section, we list several incidents at each
layer of the security reference architecture. In detail, Table III
contains incidents of public networks at the network layer,
Table IV lists incidents of the consensus layer, Table V focuses
on the RSM layer, and Table VI shows a few examples of
incidents at the application layer.
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Acronym
/ Incident Threat/ Vulnerability
Reference Description Impact ($)
Canadian Bitcoin hijack
(February 2013)
BGP prefix hijacking
(routing attack & eclipse
attack)
[315] Intercepted data between Bitcoin miners and Bitcoin mining pools.
Tricked honest miners were mining on an attacker controlled pool.
83,000
Bitcoin deanonymiza-
tion (March 2015)
Sybil attack (identity re-
vealing attacks)
[59] A large number of fake nodes were introduced to deanonymize client
traffic.
—
MyEtherWallet hijack
(April 2018)
BGP hijacking (routing
attack)
[291], [292] A BGP hijack have been performed against Amazon DNS, leading to
the wallet’s server domain name being resolved to a Russian phishing
site in several cities.
152,000
Electrum DoS
(August 2019)
Volumetric DoS [316] DoS of legitimate Electrum servers was conducted as an attempt to
get connected vulnerable Electrum wallets to a malicious server, which
resulted in a loss of wallet funds.
In millions
Bitcoin partitioning
(proof-of-concept)
Prefix hijacking (routing
attack)
[317] An attack to partition Bitcoin network by hijacking IP prefixes. —
Erebus (proof-of-
concept)
Malicious ISP attack [318] ISP uses its topological advantage to launch a stealthy partition attack. —
Eclipse attack on Bit-
coin (proof-of-concept)
Un-authenticated and
unreliable peers
[47] A view of the network by eclipsed peers is fully under the attacker’s
control.
—
De-anonymization in
Bitcoin with Tor
(proof-of-concept)
Abusing Bitcoin DoS
protection (identity re-
vealing attack)
[57] Bitcoin peers were forced to ban Tor exit nodes of attacker’s choice by
abusing Bitcoin DoS protection. Thus, the attacker was able to control
all remaining Tor exit nodes and cause client traffic to pass through
them.
—
Suspected Penny flood-
ing on Bitcoin (Decem-
ber 2017)
DoS on a mempool (at-
tacking local resources)
[319] Flooding a mempool with low fee transactions resulted in clogged up
memory of consensus nodes and increased transaction processing fees.
—
2X-Mempool-Attack on
Bitcoin (suspected)
Flooding by high-fee
transactions (DoS on
processing of legitimate
transactions)
[320] Mempool is flooded by high-fee transactions, preventing regular-fee
transactions being processed timely.
—
Table III: Incidents that occurred at the network layer (public networks).
Acronym
/ Incident Threat/ Vulnerability
Reference Description Impact ($)
Ethereum Classic
(January 2019)
51% attack & double spend-
ing (violation of assump-
tions)
[321] A 51% attack on Ethereum Classic led to a deep chain reorganization,
which included double-spending attacks against Binance and Bitrue
wallets.
1,100,000
Monacoin
(May 2018)
51% attack & double spend-
ing (violation of assump-
tions)
[322] A block reorganization on Monacoin included double-spending attacks
that targeted several “Western exchanges” (particularly Livecoin).
Unconfirmed reports on Reddit mention losses of 90,000 USD.
90,000
Bitcoin Gold
(May 2018)
51% attack & double spend-
ing (violation of assump-
tions)
[323] A Block withholding attack on Bitcoin Gold led to 76 double-spent
transactions, mostly targeting cryptocurrency exchanges.
18,600,000
Litecoin Cash
(May 2018)
51% attack & double spend-
ing (violation of assump-
tions)
[324] A similar double-spending attack targeted Litecoin cash – the lead
developer “Tanner” stated that he believes the mining power may have
been rented.
—
Zencash
(June 2018)
51% attack & double spend-
ing (violation of assump-
tions)
[325] A 51% attack led to several block reorganizations, with the largest
one that reversed 38 blocks. Only two transactions included double
spending, but these were large enough to cause considerable losses.
550,000
Verge
(April 2018)
51% attack & semantic bug
(violation of assumptions)
[284] A vulnerability in Verge’s difficulty adjustment algorithm was used to
amplify a 51% attack.
3,850,000
Verge
(May 2018)
51% attack & semantic bug
(violation of assumptions)
[326] An inadequate response by Verge developers to the previous attack led
to it being repeated a month later.
1,750,000
Checklocktime,
CensorshipCon,
GoldfingerCon,
etc.
Bribery attacks [327] Various bribery attacks have been listed in the literature. In these
attacks, it is profitable for consensus nodes to accept bribes for
deviation from the protocol.
—
Table IV: Incidents that occurred at the consensus layer.
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Acronym
/ Incident Threat/ Vulnerability
Reference Description Impact ($) SWC Entry
DAO Attack
(June 2016) Reentrancy [328] A vulnerability in the code allowed a repeated with-drawal of ether, which could be exploited with a
malicious fallback function.
70,000,000 SWC-107
King of the Ether Throne
(February 2016) Unchecked returnvalue
[329] An unchecked return value prevented the rightful
compensation of the user.
300 SWC-104
RockPaperScissors Storing secrets [330] A smart contract relied on a secret value that should
not be visible to other users.
—
Integer overflow and
underflow
[331] The user’s input was not properly sanitized and
overflow / underflow was possible.
SWC-101
Unexpected value re-
ceived
[332] A smart contract may contain conditions that rely
on a certain balance, but the attacker is able to send
an unexpected monetary value to the contract and
disrupt the intended functionality.
— SWC-132
Delegatecall [138] Solidity has a feature called delegatecall that enables
remote calls of other contracts. Such calls cause an
execution of untrusted contracts in the context of the
caller, hence all vulnerabilities of the remote code
can be exploited.
— SWC-112
Parity multisig hack
(July 2017) Default function visi-bility
[333] Solidity functions are public per default. This can
be easily exploited if a developer forgets to make
critical functions private.
30,000,000 SWC-100
TheRun
(April 2016) Weak source of ran-domness
[334] Relying on the block number or timestamp as a
source for randomness is not safe, since it can allow
a prediction of the next random number.
— SWC-120
GovernMental
(March 2016) DoS [335] The gas limit or failing calls to external functions canlead to situations where a contract becomes unusable.
11,000 SWC-113,SWC-128
EXTCODESIZE DoS attack
(September 2016) DoS [336] The attack exploited a mismatch between the com-putational cost of some operations and their gas cost.
—
Rubixi
(March 2016) Unprotected Etherwithdrawal
[138] The access to administration or initialization func-
tions had not been adjusted properly. Missing modi-
fiers or an improperly named function might lead to
unauthorized access.
— SWC-105,SWC-118
Bancor
(June 2017) Front-running / trans-action order depen-
dency
[138] Some contracts rely on the transaction order to
make a decision. For example, a winner of a game
is chosen from the first transaction with a correct
answer. Since the transactions can be inspected by
the consensus nodes before they are included, the
attacker might steal the answer and make a transac-
tion with a higher fee, which will be included as the
first one.
— SWC-114
Timestamp
dependency
[139] Some contracts might use the current timestamp to
trigger certain events. However, timestamps can be
adjusted by malicious consensus nodes.
— SWC-116
Write to an arbitrary
storage location
[337] By taking advantage of neighboring addresses in
the storage and un-sanitized code, the unauthorized
attacker might write to sensitive storage locations.
— SWC-124
Parity multisig hack 2
(November 2017) Unprotectedselfdestruct call
[338] The unprotected self destruct functionality can be
exploited to destroy contracts (or libraries), and
potentially freeze funds in them.
150,000,000 SWC-106
Table V: Incidents and possible vulnerabilities at the RSM layer.
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Acronym
/ Incident Threat/ Vulnerability
Reference Description Impact ($)
Gatecoin
(May 2016) Centralized server com-promise (single-point-of-
failure)
[339] The exchange was the victim of a man-in-the-middle
attack. The malicious external party was involved in this
breach, and it managed to alter Gatecoin’s system so that
deposit transfers bypassed the multisig cold storage and
went to hot wallets, which were exploited due to OPSEC
issues.
25,160,000
Doge Vault
(May 2014) Centralized server com-promise (single-point-of-
failure)
[340] The attacker gained access to the server where Doge
Vault’s virtual machines were running, providing him
with full access to the systems.
56,000
BIPS.me
(November 2013) DDoS + access subver-sion on centralized server
(single-point-of-failure)
[341] An initial DDoS attack caused vulnerability to the sys-
tem, which has then enabled the attacker to gain access
and compromise several wallets.
554,260
Bitfinex
(August 2016) Centralized server (single-point-of-failure)
[342] Although Bitfinex used 2-of-3 multisig wallets, two of
these keys were owned by Bitfinex (one stored in cold
wallet), while the user owned only a single key. It is not
clear whether this incident involved insider threat or it
was conducted externally.
71,288,416
Bitcoin Central
(April 2013) Centralized server com-promise (single-point-of-
failure)
[343] Password was reset from the hosting provider’s web
interface, enabling the attacker to lock out of the interface
and request a reboot of the machine into rescue mode.
Next, the attacker has stolen private keys from the hot
wallet.
—
Cyber-squatting attacks
in NameCoin Violation of accurate reg-istration
[215] Cyber-squatters seized identities that do not belong to
them nor represent themselves.
—
Front-Running on
Ethereum Exchanges Front-running inIntra-Chain Exchanges
[90] Arbitrage bots front-run user issued exchange transac-
tions with the ones with the higher fees. Therefore, user
issued transactions are discarded or traded with worse
exchange rate as intended.
—
Table VI: Incidents that occurred at the application layer.
